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The cover: Three Courtesans Practicing Calligraphy. An Oban print by Utamaro. The writing in the upper right relates the following. 'In the time of the gods it is said that Japanese cut wood and tied knots on ropes to record various things. Grand Minister Kibi invented the *katakana* syllabary and the Buddhist priest Kobo Taishi invented the 47 *hiragana* syllabary from the Buddhist sutras. This was the beginning of Japanese writing.' The calligraphy the women are writing represents Kobo Taishi and the go board represents Grand Minister Kibi, who is said to have introduced go into Japan. The story of Grand Minister Kibi can be found at <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/kibi.html>. (From the Mita Arts Gallery collection)

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Go World News

July~October 2003

by John Power

International



Yi's victory interview

Yi Se-tol wins 16th Fujitsu Cup

Yi Se-tol has declared on a number of occasions that it is his ambition to be recognized as the world's strongest player. He took a big step towards achieving this ambition when he won the Fujitsu Cup for the second year in a row.

Last year, when he was 19, Yi became the youngest player ever to win this tournament. This year his opponent was the youngest finalist ever: Song T'ae-kon 4-dan, who is 16. Song is the latest prodigy to emerge in Korea, but in the final Yi's greater experience — after all, he's no teenager now — seemed to make the difference. Actually, Yi's toughest game was his semifinal against Yoda, which he won by just half a point. For his part, Song scored a triumph in his semifinal by defeating Yi Ch'ang-ho. Both these games and the final are given in this issue.

This tournament showed that Korea had got over its setback in the CSK Cup. Korean players took the top three places, and for the third year in a row both finalists were Korean.

Thanks to his victory, Yi was promoted to 9-dan, making him the youngest 9-dan in the history of go. Yi started out the year as a 3-dan, then was promoted to 6-dan for winning the 7th LG Cup, then 7-dan for coming second in the KT Masters Cup (a domestic Korean tournament). He must be the only player ever to be promoted three times in one year (actually less than four and a half months) and to go up six dan levels. (Song's second place earned him promotion to 5-dan.)

In a break with the previous pattern, the final was played immediately after the semifinals instead of a month later. Another change this year is that the prize money has been reduced. First prize is 15 million yen (previously 20 million), second five million (seven million), third three million (four million), and fourth 1.5 million (two million).

Results:

Semifinals (5 July, Nihon Ki-in, Tokyo)

Yi Se-tol 7-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) by half a point; Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (Korea) (B) b. Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) by resig.

Final (7 July, Nihon Ki-in)

Yi (W) b. Song by resig.

Play-off for 3rd place

Yi Ch'ang-ho (W) b. Yoda by resig.

8th Samsung Cup: China does well

China has done best in this tournament, getting two players, Hu Yaoyu and Xie He, into the semifinals. The 19-year-old Xie 5-dan is a relatively new face, but he did win the Chinese individual championship last year. Korea has one player, Pak Yeong-hun, who is joined by Cho Chikun, representing Japan. Cho has posted his best result for some time in an international tournament — he doesn't usually shine in fast games. It's also unusual to see both the Yis, Ch'ang-ho and Se-tol, fail to make the semifinal round.

The semifinals are scheduled for 4, 5 and 7 November and the final for January 2004.

Round 1 (Seoul, 27 August)

Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan (Korea) (W) beat Yi 2-dan (Korea) by resig.; Wang Yuhui 8-dan (China) (B) b. Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea) by 5½ points; Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Zhang Wendong 9-dan (China) by resig.; Yamada Kimio 8-dan (Japan) (B) b. Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by resig.; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by ½; Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) (W) b. Cho Han-seung 6-dan (Korea) by resig.; Song T'ae-kon 5-dan (Korea) (W) b. Qiu Jun 6-dan (China) by resig.; Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Kim Chu-ho 4-dan (Korea) by resig.; Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan (Korea) (W) beat Liu Jing 8-dan (China) on time; Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 5-dan (Korea) (B) b. Chang Hao 9-dan (China) by 2½; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Peng Quan 5-dan (China) by 1½; Weon Seong-chin 3-dan (Korea) (W) b. Wang Lei 8-dan (China) by resig.; Ding Wei 8-dan (China) (B) b. Kim Chong-su 5-dan (Korea) by resig.; Xie He 5-dan (China) (B) b. Yi Chae-ung 2-dan (Korea) by ½; Han Chong-chin 5-dan (Korea) (B) b. Kato Masao 9-dan (Japan) by 4½; Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Kong Jie 7-dan (China) by resig.

Round 2 (Seoul, 29 August)

Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (B) beat Han Chong-chin 5-dan (Korea) by resig.; Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan (Korea) (B) b. Ding Wei 8-dan (China) on time; Xie He 5-dan (China) (W) b. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 5-dan (Korea) by resig.; Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Song T'ae-kon 5-dan (Korea) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) (B) b. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) by 3½; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Wang Yuhui 7-dan (China) by resig.; Cho Chikun (W) b. Weon Seong-chin by resig.; Yamada Kimio (W) b. Jiang Zhujiu by 1½.

Quarterfinals

(11 October) Pak (B) b. Yamada by resig.; Xie He (B) b. Yi Ch'ang-ho by ½.

(12 October) Cho Chikun (B) b. Cho Hun-hyeon by resig.; Hu Yaoyu (W) b. Yi Se-tol by resig.

China wins King of the New Stars play-off

Korea is not having everything its way on the international scene. In the 6th China-Korea King of the New Stars play-off, Kong Jie 7-dan (aged 21) of China beat Korea's newest star, Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (aged 16), 2-0.

So far, the two countries have split the honours, with three wins each in this tournament, which is sponsored by the Sports Seoul newspaper. First prize is 4,900,000 won (about \$4,200); second prize is 2,100,000 won (about \$1,760).

The results:

Game 1 (29 June). Kong (W) by resig.

Game 2 (30 June). Kong (B) by resig.

Since we missed this title in *The Go Player's Almanac*, here are the previous results.

1 (1998). Mok Chin-seok 4-dan (Korea) beat Shao Junjie (China) 4-dan 2-1.

2 (1999). Kim Man-su 4-dan (Korea) beat Hu Yaoyu 5-dan (China) 2-0.

3 (2000). Liu Shizhen 5-dan (China) beat Yi Sang-hun 3-dan (Korea) 2-0.

4 (2001). Gu Li 5-dan (China) beat Cho Han-seung 4-dan (Korea) 2-1.

5 (2002). Yi Se-tol 3-dan (Korea) beat Peng Quan 4-dan (China) 2-1.

Zhou wins 15th TV Asia Cup

Zhou Heyang of China has been one of the most promising new players to emerge on the international scene, and in particular his good results against Yi Ch'ang-ho have attracted attention. At the age of 27, Zhou has finally won his first international title, the 15th TV Asia Cup.

This tournament was also notable for the good performance of Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan of Japan, who beat last year's champion, Yi Ch'ang-ho, in the semifinal.

The tournament was played at the Mayfield Hotel in Seoul. Full results are given below.

4 September

Round 1

Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan (Japan) (W) defeated Peng Quan 6-dan (China) by 2½ points.

Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (W) d. Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan (Korea) by resig.

5 September

Round 1

O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) (B) d. Yi Sang-hun 7-dan (Korea) by resig.

Semifinal

Mimura (W) d. Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) by resig.

6 September

Semifinal

Zhou (B) d. O by half a point.

7 September

Final

Zhou (W) d. Mimura by resig.

Japan-China Cyberspace '5x5' Team Match

To make up for the disruption to the international tournament scene caused by the SARS scare, Japan and China organized an Internet team tournament. The result was a one-sided win for China, but that was perhaps not surprising, as

its team was made up of its top-ranked players. It was only in the final game that Japan was able to pick up a win.

Results:

Game 1 (4 August). Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (B) beat Cho U 9-dan (Japan) by $\frac{1}{2}$.

Game 2 (25 August). Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (W) b. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) by $14\frac{1}{2}$.

Game 3 (1 Sept.). Gu Li 7-dan (China) (B) b. Takao Shinji 8-dan by resig.

Game 4 (9 Sept.). Wang Lei 8-dan (W) b. Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan by resig.

Game 5 (30 Sept.). O Rissei 9-dan (W) b. Kong Jie 7-dan by resig.

2nd Cheongkwang Cup dominated by Korea

The opening rounds of the 2nd Cheongkwang Cup, a Korean-sponsored women's international tournament, were held in Beijing on 8 to 10 October. The name of this tournament literally means 'upright official's village'; it is the name of a health food made from red ginseng. Korean players dominated the tournament, taking all the semifinal places, though, of course, one of them is the Chinese-born Rui Naiwei, who won the inaugural cup last year.

First round (8 October, Beijing)

Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea) (B) beat Osawa Narumi 3-dan (Japan) by resig.; Aoki Kikuyo 8-dan (Japan) (W) b. Yu Hailing 1-dan (China) by resig.; Hua Xueming 7-dan (China) (B) b. He Xiaoren 5-dan (China) by resig.; Pak Chi-eun 4-dan (Korea) (W) b. Okada Yumiko 6-dan (Japan) by resig.; Meng Zhaoyu 2-dan (China) (B) b. Kobayashi Izumi 5-dan (Japan) by forfeit (Kobayashi made an illegal move, but we don't have details); Zhang 1-dan (China) (W) b. Kim 1-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yi Yeong-sin 2-dan (Korea) (W) b. Zhang Xuan 8-dan (China) by $2\frac{1}{2}$; Yun Yeong-seon 2-dan (Korea) b. Zheng Yan 2-dan (China) by $\frac{1}{2}$.

Second round (9 October)

Pak (W) b. Zhang by resig.; Yun (W) b. Meng by resig.

(10 October)

Rui (W) b. Aoki by resig.; Yi (W) b. Hua by resig.

1st Inch'on International Amateur Championship

This year the World Amateur Go Championship was not held because of the SARS epidemic, but Korea took up the slack, founding the Inch'on International Amateur Championship. This was held in the city of Inch'on, which is the main port for Seoul, from 27 September to 3 Oc-

tober, with 58 countries and territories participating.

The tournament system was a little different from the WAGC. After a six-round Swiss system, the top four players qualified for a two-round knockout. The major surprise was the failure of the Chinese representative to secure a place in this knockout: Yi Guosun lost to Hiraoka Satoshi of Japan in the third round and although he finished in a tie for 1st, he was bumped down to 5th place on SOS. (What this result shows, incidentally, is that six rounds are not enough for a 58-player Swiss.)

Qualifying for the knockout with Hiraoka were Kim Jun-hwan of Korea, Emil Nijhuis of the Netherlands, and Dmitry Bogatsky of the Ukraine. Kim and Hiraoka went through to the final; here Hiraoka, playing black, defeated Kim by half a point. Hiraoka lost to Kim in the sixth round of the Swiss, but he won the one that counted, and so has a new trophy to add to his 1994 WAGC championship cup.

Nijhuis took third place.

5th Nong Shim Cup starts

For once, Japan made a good start in the Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup, a team tournament for five-player teams from Japan, China and Korea. Japan's top batter, Cho U, won two games. However, Wang Lei of China then took over and also won two in a row.

The Beijing round

Game 1 (22 Oct.). Cho U 9-dan (Japan) (W) beat Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by resig.

Game 2 (23 Oct.). Cho (B) beat Heo 2-dan (Korea) by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 3 (24 Oct.). Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (B) beat Cho by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 4 (25 Oct.). Wang (B) beat Hong Minpyo by resig.

The other players on the Japanese team are Rin Kaiho, Kobayashi Koichi, Kato Masao, and Ryu Shikun. The other Chinese players are Zhou Heyang (who beat Chang Hao in the final round of the qualifying tournament), Hu Yaoyu, and Gu Li.

The above are all well-known players. The Japanese team is chosen by the Nihon Ki-in and, as always, it is missing the top titleholders, like Yoda, Yamashita, and Hane, as they are too busy with title matches. The Chinese team is chosen through a qualifying tournament, and apart from

Chang Hao, they make up the current top group in China.

The Korean team is a different story. In the past, the Korean players were chosen by the Korean Ki-in, so it was usually made up of the most successful players internationally. However, this year former stalwarts like Cho Hun-hyeon and Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, are missing. Yi Ch'ang-ho is a member, but he is the only seeded player. The other players are Pak Chi-eun 4-dan, the first woman player ever to win a place in this tournament, Weon Seong-chin, Hong Min-pyo 3-dan, and Heo 2-dan (we don't know his given name). These four beat out their seniors in an elimination tournament in which 183 players took part. New stars like Song T'ae-kon and Pak Yeong-hun didn't make it (Yi Se-tol is missing for a different reason: he boycotted the tournament because he maintained that it should have been used to choose *all five* places on the team — it seems he objects to Yi Ch'ang-ho's being seeded). The success of these youngsters (average age 21) in taking over the team is yet another sign of the phenomenal strength of the new generation in Korea.

Current international champions

- 4th Ing Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
- 1st Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
- 16th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
- 7th Samsung Cup: Cho Hun-hyeon (Korea)
- 4th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
- 7th LG Cup: Yi Se-tol
- 15th TV Asia Cup: Zhou Heyang (China)
- 1st Cheongkwangjang Cup: Rui Naiwei (Korea)
- 4th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Korea
- 2nd CSK Cup: Japan

Most world championships won

- 18: Yi Ch'ang-ho
- 11: Cho Hun-hyeon
- 6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok
- 4: Yoda Norimoto
- 3: Yi Se-tol
- 2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, Yu Bin, O Rissei
- 1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho, Cho Chikun, Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang

(By country) Korea: 39; Japan: 17;
China: 5

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 10

Japan: 1

News from Japan



Cho U reaches the top.

Cho U wins 58th Honinbo title

Another member of the new generation in Japan has made a big breakthrough. In his second attempt, Cho U took the Honinbo title, defeating Kato Masao 4-2. At 23 years five months, Cho is the third-youngest player ever to win a big-three title and the second youngest to win the Honinbo. The rejuvenation of Japanese go continues apace.

The match was closer than the score might seem to indicate. Kato actually played very well, but was not a match for Cho's greater tenacity. Actually, Cho demonstrated considerable talent and versatility, and he looks like becoming a successor to Rin Kaiho. (He is the third Taiwanese player, after Rin Kaiho and O Meien, to become Honinbo.)

Under the new promotion rules, this victory earned Cho immediate promotion to 9-dan; at 23, he is the youngest-ever 9-dan in Japan.

Results:

Game 1 (14, 15 May). Kato (B) by resig.

Game 2 (26, 27 May). Cho (B) by resig.



Reviewing the final game: Kato Masao, Kataoka Satoshi, and Cho U

59th Honinbo league (2 October 2003 to April 2004) Title-holder: Cho U

Rank	Player/opponent	KM	OM	YK	KK	YN	OR	CS	MT	Score
1	Kato Masao	—							1	1 - 0
2	O Meien		—		0					0 - 1
3	Yamashita Keigo			—						—
4	Kobayashi Koichi		1		—					1 - 1
5	Yoda Norimoto					—				—
5	O Rissei						—			—
5	Cho Sonjin							—		—
5	Mimura Tomoyasu	0							—	0 - 1

Game 3 (2, 3 June). Kato (B) by resig.
 Game 4 (16, 17 June). Cho (B) by resig.
 Game 5 (25, 26 June). Cho (W) by 5½.
 Game 6 (10, 11 July). Cho (B) by 9½.

59th Honinbo league

The new league has barely started. The new members include Yoda, making a comeback after a 12-year absence. For some reason, he's always done much better in the Meijin tournament (like Otake Hideo a couple of decades ago). A big surprise is the absence of the greatest tournament Honinbo, Cho Chikun, who was unable to win his way back in.

In the qualifying tournament, Sakai Hideyuki 6-dan, the former WAGC champion who turned professional, almost made it into the league; he lost the final game to Cho Sonjin.

Yoda wins back Gosei

Yoda Norimoto has regained the Gosei title that he lost to Kobayashi Koichi in 1999. For the first four games, this year's match followed the same pattern as the previous one, with Yoda winning the first two games, then Kobayashi fighting back to level the score. This time, however, Yoda kept his nerve in the final game and reclaimed his title.

28th Meijin league (28 November 2002 to 7 August 2003)

Title-holder: Yoda Norimoto

Place	Player/opponent	CC	RS	YK	OM	RK	OR	TM	MT	CU	Score
5	Cho Chikun	—	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	4 – 4
—	Ryu Shikun	0	—	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2 – 6
1	Yamashita Keigo	1	1	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	8 – 0
6	O Meien	0	1	0	—	0	0	1	1	0	3 – 5
2	Rin Kaiho	1	1	0	1	—	0	1	1	1	6 – 2
4	O Rissei	1	0	0	1	1	—	1	1	0	5 – 3
—	Takemiya Masaki	0	1	0	0	0	0	—	0	0	1 – 7
—	Mizokami T.	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	0	1 – 7
3	Cho U	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	—	6 – 2

It's interesting to note that this title has been monopolized by players from the northern island of Hokkaido since 1996 — in sequence, Yoda, Kobayashi, Yamashita Keigo, Kobayashi again, and now back to Yoda.

Incidentally, this was the first title match in Japan to use the new 6½-point komi.

Game 1 (1 July). Yoda (B) by 10½.

Game 2 (17 July). Yoda (W) 8½.

Game 3 (31 July). Kobayashi (W) by 4½.

Game 4 (20 August). Kobayashi (B) by ½.

Game 5 (27 August). Yoda (W) by 3½.

Yoda defends Meijin title

As it featured a clash between the top two players, the 28th Meijin title match was expected to be the highlight of the tournament year, but it turned out to be surprisingly one-sided. Moreover, it came to an anticlimactic end when the challenger, Yamashita Keigo Kisei, hallucinated in a life-and-death position in a game in which he had taken the lead. That gave the series to Yoda Norimoto by a 4–1 margin.

Yamashita seemed to come into this match with a lot of momentum; in only his second Meijin league, he had a perfect record of eight wins to no loss. He was only the fourth player to achieve this feat in the 42 Meijin leagues to date (28 Asahi-sponsored and 14 Yomiuri-sponsored), but there is a curious jinx: none of the players with perfect scores has won the title.

Yamashita's challenge got off to a poor start in the first two games: he didn't play his natural game, based on thickness and centre influence. His strategy was inconsistent, and he was easily outmanoeuvred by Yoda, who has been enjoying excellent form this year. Yoda's mastery was so complete that the series looked like fizzling out.

Fortunately for go fans, Yamashita reverted to his usual 'power go' in the third game and scored a good win. In retrospect, the fourth game was decisive: Yoda let Yamashita set up a large moyo for the first time in the series, but then skilfully reduced it. At this stage, no one doubted that Yoda was going to defend his title, though the series would certainly have been more interesting if Yamashita hadn't blown his lead in the fifth game. However, even though Yamashita clearly did not play his best, one got the impression that even his best might not have been good enough. Yoda has reached maturity as a player, and in this series he demonstrated outstanding positional judgement, backed up by accurate analysis. On current form, he seems to be the best player in Japan.

Yoda has now won the Meijin title four years in a row, which puts him in third place for successive wins after Kobayashi Koichi (seven years in a row) and Cho Chikun (five years in a row and four years in a row). If he can pull off another defence next year, he will qualify for the title of Honorary Meijin. People on the go scene have been saying recently that he looks like becoming one of the great Meijins.

The results:

Game 1 (10, 11 Sept.). Yoda (B) by 7½.

Game 2 (24, 25 Sept.). Yoda (W) by resig.

Game 3 (1, 2 Oct.). Yamashita (W) by 2½.

Game 4 (15, 16 Oct.). Yoda (W) by 3½.

Game 5 (22, 23 Oct.). Yoda (B) by resig.

28th Kisei challenger: Cho Chikun or Hane

Next year's Kisei title match will either feature a clash between two of the top players of the younger generation or witness an attempt by the best performer in two-day go to reclaim the title.

28th Kisei A League (12 June to 2 October 2003)

Place	Player/Opponent	OR	HN	KS	IY	MT	IY	Score
2	O Rissei Judan	—	0	1	1	1	0	3–2
1	Hane Naoki Tengen	1	—	1	1	1	1	5–0
—	Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan	0	0	—	1	0	0	1–4
—	Ishida Yoshio 9-dan	0	0	0	—	0	0	0–5
3	Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan	0	0	1	1	—	1	3–2
4	Imamura Yoshiaki 8-dan	1	0	1	1	0	—	3–2

28th Kisei B League (5 June to 9 October 2003)

Place	Player/Opponent	RS	CU	YN	CC	OM	AS	Score
—	Ryu Shikun 9-dan	—	1	0	0	0	0	1–4
3	Cho U 8-dan	0	—	1	1	0	1	3–2
4	Yoda Norimoto Meijin	1	0	—	0	0	1	2–3
1	Cho Chikun 9-dan	1	0	1	—	1	1	4–1
2	O Meien Oza	1	1	1	0	—	1	4–1
—	Awaji Shuzo 9-dan	1	0	0	0	0	—	1–4

In the A League, Hane Naoki finished with a perfect score and actually clinched first place in the fourth round. In the B League, Cho Chikun had to go the full distance and even then had to rely on taking precedence in a tie thanks to his higher ranking.

The play-off to decide the challenger is scheduled for 13 November.

Incidentally, the luckiest player in the leagues has to be Imamura Yoshiaki: he kept his place with three half-point wins.

Cho U to challenge for Oza

Cho U has continued to do well after winning his first big title. The play-off to decide the 51st Oza challenger, held on 18 September, was a Honinbo rematch, but Kato Masao let slip his opportunity to take revenge. Although he played very well in the first half of the game, he slipped up in the latter part, and victory went to Cho U by 3½ points.

This is Cho's first challenge for the Oza title. The titleholder is O Meien, who rebuffed Cho's first Honinbo challenge in 2001.

The title match begins on 30 October.

Yamashita Tengen challenger

Yamashita Keigo Kisei became the challenger for the 29th Tengen title by defeating Kono Rin 7-dan in the play-off, held on 9 October. Yamashita has an overwhelming lead of 8–2

in previous encounters with the titleholder, Hane Naoki, but past results are not always a good guide, especially with young, rapidly improving players.

The first game is scheduled for 30 October.

22nd Women's Honinbo title match tied

Kobayashi Izumi made a bad start to her defence of her title, but she recovered to tie the series in the second game. The challenger is Yashiro Kumiko 5-dan, making her title-match debut. Kobayashi has done badly against Yashiro in the past, but her win in the second game should give her confidence, as it broke a four-game losing streak.

Results to date:

Game 1 (2 Oct.). Yashiro (B) by resig.

Game 2 (16 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by 6½.

Kato wins Agon Kiriya Cup

Kato Masao finally won a victory over Cho U this year, defeating him in the final of the 10th Agon Kiriya Cup, held on 13 October. Holding white, Kato played what was described as a 'haya-go masterpiece' and secured a resignation after 220 moves. This gave him some revenge for his Honinbo and Oza losses.

Kato has now won 47 titles, which puts him in 4th place after Cho Chikun (65), Kobayashi Koichi (57), and Otake Hideo (48).

Kobayashi Izumi drops out of 42nd Judan

As reported in GW98, Kobayashi Izumi became the first woman ever to reach the main section of the Judan tournament, that is, the last sixteen, but she lost her first game in the winners' section. Unfortunately, she also lost immediately in the losers' section (to Yamada Kimio 8-dan, 26 June), so she has been eliminated.

The finalists in the winners' section have already been decided: two big guns in Yoda Meijin and Cho Honinbo.

Kansai Ki-in's first woman 8-dan

There are no female 9-dans in Japan, but there are two 8-dans at the Nihon Ki-in: Sugiuchi Kazuko and Aoki Kikuyo. The Kansai Ki-in now joins them with its first 8-dan: Yoshida Mika (aged 32). Yoshida is the Kansai Ki-in's most successful woman player, with four Women's Honinbo titles and one Women's Kakusei title to her name. She earned her promotion on 25 August.

Fujisawa Shuko returns to Nihon Ki-in

Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei, and the Nihon Ki-in have patched up their differences, so Shuko has once again become a member of the Nihon Ki-in.

Shuko left the Nihon Ki-in in November 1999, claiming that its diplomas were too expensive and criticizing the managerial stagnation of the Ki-in. He proposed to issue his own, much cheaper diplomas. That hit the Nihon Ki-in where it lives, as diplomas are one of its main sources of income. It reacted strongly, refusing to process Shuko's resignation and instead granting itself the satisfaction of expelling him.

Shuko then became a nonperson at the Nihon Ki-in, with his books being withdrawn from sale. However, he is one of the greatest go figures of the last half century, and next year the Ki-in celebrates its 80th anniversary, so many people were unhappy with having Shuko out in the wilderness. The fact that a reform-minded board of directors took over the administration of the Nihon Ki-in last year alleviated Shuko's dissatisfaction with the Ki-in, and this year a reconciliation was effected. The board decided to readmit Shuko on 1 July. (Our guess is that the board's Vice President, Kato Masao, may have played a key role here. As a youngster, Kato was taken under Shuko's wing, and they played hundreds of informal games, many of them at Shuko's

real-estate office in Yoyogi when he was pretending to be a businessman.)

Just for the record, Shuko was born a year after the founding of the Ki-in, and was a professional from 1940 to 1998.

Kobayashi Koichi wins 57th title

Although he has been overshadowed a little by the young lions now dominating Japanese go, Kobayashi has still got what it takes. In the final of the 12th Ryusei tournament, played on 9 September and telecast on the 28th, he defeated Hane Naoki Tengen and so won this title for the second year in a row and the third time overall. (Kobayashi had white and forced a resignation.)

This is Kobayashi's 57th title, but at his current pace it won't be easy to catch up with Cho Chikun (65) and Sakata Eio (64).

So Yokoku wins Shinjin-O

So Yokoku 7-dan, a Chinese-born player who came to Japan in 1991, has won his first title. In the 28th Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars) title match, he defeated Fujii Shuya 5-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, who, like So, was making his title-match debut, 2-0.

The results:

Game 1 (29 Sept.). So (B) by 3½.

Game 2 (9 Oct.). So (W) by resig.

Yuki wins 1st JAL Super Haya-go

This tournament amalgamates and replaces three fast-go tournaments: the Kakusei Cup, the Haya-go Championship, and the New Stars (Shin'ei). Yuki Satoshi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in was the last Kakusei winner and he has followed that up by winning the first term of the new tournament. This is his fourth title.

In the final, Yuki (W) defeated Cho U Honinbo by 5½ points. Incidentally, this tournament really qualifies as a lightning tournament, as the players have just ten seconds per move, though they also have ten minutes thinking time that they can use at will in one-minute units (NHK style).

Promotions

The following players have won promotion by the transitional Oteai system):

To 8-dan: Nakane Naoyuki

To 5-dan: Mitsunaga Junzo

To 3-dan: Kawada Kohei

The first player to be promoted in the new system on the basis of number of games won is Inagaki Yo, who went up to 4-dan on 24 October. Since there has been only one promotion since this system started in April, it looks as if it really is putting a brake on dan inflation.

Honinbos to marry

An article in the 27 October *Asahi Newspaper* disclosed that Cho U Honinbo and Kobayashi Izumi Women's Honinbo planned to become engaged on 9 November and to get married in spring next year. Apparently the two have been dating for two years. There are already 11 married couples among the members of the Nihon Ki-in, but Cho, as Honinbo, and Kobayashi, as a dual titleholder, will easily be the strongest.

Kobayashi is the daughter of Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan and the late Kobayashi Reiko 7-dan and the granddaughter of Kitani Minoru 9-dan, so she is a third-generation professional. What are the chances that in a couple of decades we'll see the first fourth-generation professional?

News from Korea

Yi defends 37th Wangwi title

Cho Hun-hyeon made his fourth challenge to his disciple Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan since the latter took this title from Yu Ch'ang-hyeok in 1996. The best he was able to do previously was to take one game off the titleholder. This time his challenge was rebuffed in similar fashion, with Yi dropping just the third game. He has now held this title for eight years in a row and needs one more victory to match Cho's record of nine successive terms (set from 1982 to 1990).

The results:

Game 1 (11 July). Yi (W) by 4½.

Game 2 (19 July). Yi (B) by 1½.

Game 3 (28 July). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 4 (6 August). Yi (B) by resig.

Cho leads in Myeong-in title match

Nothing daunted by the above setback, Cho is also trying his luck in the 34th Myeong-in (= Meijin) title, which Yi Ch'ang-ho has held for a mere half decade. Cho made a good start, winning the first game (10 October) by resignation.

Cho earned the right to challenge Yi by defeating Yi Se-tol in the final round of the league,

played on 30 September. Taking black, Cho forced a resignation and won the league 6-1.

Song wins KBS Paduk Wang title

Song T'ae-kon 5-dan, the newest star in Korean go, has won the 22nd KBS Cup Paduk Wang (King of Go) title. Song, who turned 17 on 8 September, defeated the 22-year-old Pak Pyeong-kyu 3-dan 2-0 in the final. Both Song and Pak qualify for next year's TV Asia Cup. Thanks to his win, Song earned promotion to 6-dan; this follows his promotion to 5-dan for coming 2nd in the 16th Fujitsu Cup.

The games were played on 4 and 10 October.

Song wins 3rd Osram Korea Cup

To give this new tournament its full name, it is the Osram Korea Cup New Stars Strongest Player Tournament. Song T'ae-kon 5-dan defeated Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan 2-0 and so won the cup for the second year in a row. The games were played on 24 and 31 July.

News from China

Rating list

There has been a change at the top of the Chinese rating system. In the latest list, published in June, Wang Lei has been replaced by Gu Li as the number one player. Chang Hao, who was number one in 2001, has dropped to 5th place. [Our source gives only the top seven.]

1. Gu Li 7-dan: 2,696
2. Zhou Heyang 9-dan: 2,665
3. Wang Lei 8-dan: 2,664
4. Kong Jie 7-dan: 2,661
5. Chang Hao 9-dan: 2,650
6. Hu Yaoyu 7-dan: 2,648
7. Yu Bin 9-dan: 2,643

Promotion tournament, SARS

Because of the SARS epidemic, only the professional qualifying tournament was held this year. Twenty players made the grade in the 13-round tournament, held from 26 July to 4 August.

The intercity team tournament, the A Class League, had also been interrupted by SARS, but it was resumed on 10 July. Unfortunately, we don't get enough information about this league to report on it in detail.

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The 2nd CSK Cup: A Rare Setback for Korea

As mentioned in our news section in GW98, the 2nd CSK Cup, a team tournament held in Okinawa, was the first international tournament for two years eight months that Korea failed to win. This must have been a welcome change for the players from other countries who have grown used to seeing Korea monopolize the trophies. Japan, of course, had most reason to be happy, as it beat Korea 4-1, but Chinese Taipei also scored a success, beating Korea 3-2.

In this article, we present some of the high-light games. Korean fans may think it unfair to focus on the one tournament Korea happened to lose, but, if you change the perspective, the fact that Korean losses make news is in itself a kind of tribute to the Korean domination of the international scene.

1. Yoda vs. Yi Se-tol

White: Yi Se-tol 6-dan (Korea)

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan)

Komi: 6½; **time:** 2 hours each (byo-yomi from last 5 minutes). Played at the Manza Beach Hotel in Onna Village, Okinawa on 28 April 2003.

Commentary by Awaji Shuzo 9-dan. Report by Ko Narigane (??).




Figure 1 (1-40)


Figure 1 (1-40). Yoda's good start

Up to 26, the structure of the game has been clearly defined: Black's profit vs. White's influ-


ence. Black makes an early attack on White's moyo with 27 and 31.

Awaji: 'In this game, the attack and defence on the left side is everything. This fight decided the outcome.'


White 32. The first move that would occur to an amateur is White 1 in *Dia. 1*, but as far as possible professionals prefer to avoid playing from this side. The reason is that Black easily settles his group by attaching at 2. Instead of 5 here —



Dia. 1: good for Black



Dia. 2: good for Black



Dia. 3: even

Dia. 2. If White cuts at 5, a trade follows. White can't tenuki after 16. This is no good for White.


Dia. 3. White answers the contact play by blocking at 3. If Black pulls back at 5, White plays 4 and is satisfied, but Black will make the two-step hane of 4. If 5 to 8 follow, White extends to 9, making miai of sealing Black in on the

left side and invading on the top right side. This would be a reasonable game. Instead of 8 —


Dia. 4. Black might play at 1 to prevent White from sealing him in on the side. In this case, the continuation to 9 is a one-way street, and White switches to 10.

In *Dia. 3*, Black is alive, but White can seal him in later; in *Dia. 4*, Black has poked his head out but hasn't secured two eyes yet. Each diagram has an advantage and a drawback. Black has the right to choose; probably most players would choose *Dia. 4*.

White 32 has to be compared with simply playing the diagonal move of 34. Attaching as White does is tempting.




Dia. 4: Black's alternative




Dia. 5: ominous

Instead of 38, White would also like to extend to 1 in *Dia. 5*, but the diagonal move of 2 is fierce. At one blow, this white group is teetering. White therefore wants to forestall this move by getting up to some mischief himself. An alternative to 38 is clamping at 1 in *Dia. 6*, but Black will of course extend solidly at 2. The moves to 10 can be expected. White does capture a black stone, but Black gets a comfortable position in the centre, and White's top left corner potential is

reduced [thanks to the connection of 4, Black can jump into the corner]. This is not promising for White.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. The placement of 1 looks like a fairly good move. Black will dodge lightly with 2 and 4, so next White can extend along the top (just where is a difficult question). White plays leisurely, maintaining territorial balance and hoping to attack later.

Awaji: 'Personally, I'd probably go for *Dia. 3* (or 4) or *Dia. 7*. The other variations, including the one White played in the game, look bad for White.'



Dia. 8: good for Black

White 40. Locally, White 1 in *Dia. 8* is a pattern often seen, but, after 2 to 6, extending along the top and playing the diagonal move (2 in *Dia. 5*) are miai for Black.



The start of the game between Yoda and Yi Se-tol

White therefore has little choice but to attack Black's eye shape as in the game, but after Black thrusts out into the centre with 41 and 43 in Figure 2, White's prospects of being able to continue the attack are not good. When the game develops like this, the exchange of 32 for 33 becomes a big minus for White.




Figure 2 (41-70)

Figure 2 (41-70). Easy shinogi by Black

Yoda played 45 with confidence. Yi cut immediately with 46 and 48. This may be bad shape and bad style, but White has no chance if he

doesn't start a fight

Black 59 is a tesuji for making shape. Black intends this as a sacrifice.

White refuses to follow orders, playing patiently with 60 and 62.

The threat of Black A, cutting across the knight's move, means that White can't omit 64, but Black easily settles his group up to 69.

White 70. White would like to play on a larger scale with B, but Black would play at C, and it would be hard to tell which side was doing the attacking.




Figure 3 (71-100)

Figure 3 (71–100). Black has the lead.

White 72 shows that White feels he is behind. Black forces in the centre, then plays steadily with 81 and 83.

Yi does his best after this to create complications, but Yoda plays carefully and denies him any chance.




Figure 4 (101–143)
ko (below 1): 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38

Figure 4 (101–143). A good win for Yoda

When White resigns, the bottom right corner is still a flower-viewing ko for Black, on top of which White can't tenuki in the centre bottom. This is a game in which Yoda showed to advantage.

White resigns after Black 143.
(Monthly Go World, July 2003)

2. Hane vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho

White: Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan)

Black: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Played on 28 April 2003.

Commentary by Awaji Shuzo. Report by Ko.

Earlier this year, Hane lost the Chunlan final 0–2 to Yi Ch'ang-ho. Hane: 'I wanted to be matched against Yi so that I'd have a chance to take revenge.'

Figure 1 (1–50). Yi's large moyo

Hane goes for territory, and Yi, unusually for him, responds by building a moyo.

Black 49. I'd prefer to go a step further, playing at A.




Figure 1 (1–50)



Hane plays his first move.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A fierce attack

Awaji: 'Black 57 is a move that tries to win by dozens of points. Playing around 68 looks good enough.'

White 64. You'd think there'd be no way this invader could die, but Yi exerts his great strength and launches an attack. He hopes to contrive a double attack on the centre and bottom groups.




Figure 3 (101-130)


ko: 26, 29

Figure 3 (101-130). The game is decided.

White completely secures both groups up to 14, so you might think that the game favours him, but it's actually quite difficult after Black 17. If White just pushes through as in *Dia. 1*, it will be very close.

White 18, with its threats of hanes on both

sides, decides the game. In the course of fighting a ko, White cuts the top down to size.



Dia. 1: not enough




Figure 4 (131-164)

ko: 35, 42, 45, 48; 54: connects (below 32)

Figure 4 (131-164). Hane's first win

When he finishes off the ko with 54, White can see his win.

Black 55. Even if Black uses this move to patch up his centre bottom position, White crawls at 55, putting him a little ahead.

Black 59. If Black blocks at A, White plays 59, and Black can't save his stone (13 in Figure 3), so he would lose.

After White 64, this black group can't link up to the right, so it's dead. Either Yi overlooked 60 or he was just setting the scene for resignation.

This was Hane's fourth game with Yi and

his first win, so, although he lost one game in the CSK Cup, he was probably just as happy as the players on his team who won all their games.

Black resigns after White 164
(Monthly Go World, July 2003)

3. Yamashita vs. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok

White: Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan)

Black: Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea)

Played on 28 April 2003.

Commentary by Yamashita, with reference to a commentary by Awaji.

This is the first game between these two. Yamashita showed in this year's Kisei title match that he's not averse to a fight. Yu has always been known for his aggressive, large-scale style, so an interesting game was assured. As it turned out, it was Yamashita's *shinogi* talents that were called for.




Figure 1 (1-50)

38, 45: ko


Figure 1 (1-50). A tricky joseki

The joseki from 13 is tricky and not very often played. (It's analysed in *Tournament Go 1992*, page 33.)

Cutting at 20 is the only move for a professional. If instead White connected at 48, Black would be happy to connect at 21; this result would be very painful for White, as he has played so many stones on the second line.


White 28 is probably a new move. The joseki move is White 1 in *Dia. 1*. If 2 to 6 follow, the result is the same as in the game. However,

White is being cautious with 28. There's a possibility that Black may switch to the trade in *Dia. 2*. In that case, in Yamashita's judgement, it's better to have 1 at 'a'.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Dia. 3: bad for White
4: connects

White 34. White 1 in *Dia. 3* would be bad. Squeezing may feel good, but the cut at 5 no longer serves to capture the corner black stone.

Black 37. If at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black loses sente (White will switch to 44 in the figure).

Black 43. Awaji: 'Because Yu played it, this may be correct, but I'd play at A.'

White 48, forestalling the cut one line above, is quite big. It also gives a bit of a pulse to the white stones on the outside that are playing dead.



Dia. 4: gote for Black





Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 5: more aggressive

Figure 2 (51-100). A shinogi contest

When Black threatens to take the whole top and centre with 53, White has no choice but to plunge in at 54. He stakes the game on his *shinogi*; he hopes to be able to make use of his stones to the right.

Black 55. Black must attack; defending the moyo with A would be too small (White backs up to B).

White 62, 64. Already the white group is starting to look comfortable. Black 63 looks submissive — Black could also counter with 1 in Dia. 5. This way he captures the three white stones, though White more or less settles his group with 2 to 6.

Black 71. Black decides that attacking directly will not get him anywhere; with 71, he hopes for a double attack. However, White seizes the opportunity to plunge into the top with 72.

Black 73. Necessary to forestall White C.

When White plays the shoulder hit of 82. Black goes all out to cut with 83 on. At present,

the large white group has only one eye, so White can't afford the time to connect at 93 with 88 (Black will attack at D).

Even after 98, White is not 100% alive. Instead of passively seeking life, however, he plays a nasty probe at 100.






Figure 3 (101-141)

30: captures (right of 3); 31: recaptures;
32: connects (left of 28)



Dia. 6

Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Figure 3 (101-141). Brilliant play by Yamashita

Black 1 is probably the best answer. If instead Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 6, White 2 is a tesuji; if Black pulls back at 4, White can later extend at 5 and live, but if, therefore, he ataries at 3, White forces with 4 and 6, then captures the black group above with 8. Instead —

Dia. 7. If Black 1, White has the 2-4 combination. If next Black blocks at 8, White can fight

a ko after White 5–Black ‘a’–White ‘b’. The placement of 5 is an attempt to kill White outright, but White easily lives with 6 to 10.

Dia. 8. If Black 1, White crosscuts at 2; Black 3 at ‘a’ reverts to *Dia. 6*, so Black plays 3, but again White can live at the bottom. These three variations would give Black a lost game.




Dia. 9: White lives

Black therefore has no choice about 1. Instead of 3, Black 1 in *Dia. 9* also looks possible, but White lives easily with the 2–4 combination, which makes miai of 5 and 6.

The sequence to 9 is a success for White. It may look as if he has just whittled down Black’s territory a little, but actually there is still a lot of aji left here (demonstrated by 38 later).

Black goes all out to attack White’s eye shape with 15 on, but White is alive after 22.

White 24. Usually in this kind of shape one attaches at 1 in *Dia. 10*, but here it would let Black not only live on the side but threaten White’s base. White 1 would throw the game away.



Dia. 10: making Black happy


Black 27. If Black wants to attack the eye shape of the centre white group, he has to do so with 1 etc. in *Dia. 11*. However, White picks up a second eye in the centre with the carefully timed sequence to 16. Note that his other eye can’t be destroyed — if Black ‘a’, White plays ‘b’–Black ‘c’–White ‘d’.

White 38 makes sure of a win for Yamashita.


Figure 4 (142–178). Outfighting Yu

Black is forced to scramble for two eyes up to

51. White is guaranteed a ko in the corner with Black A–White B–Black C, so he switches to 52, taking territory and simplifying the game.



Dia. 11: White lives



ments; Japanese fans have high expectations of him.

Black resigns after White 178.

(Igo, August 2003 & *Monthly Go Review*, July 2003. A photo of this game is given in GW98, page 5.)

4. Yuki vs. Song

The game between Yuki Satoshi and Korea's 16-year-old new star Song T'ae-kon was the most spectacular one of the tournament. One player's carelessness with a group provoked even greater carelessness on the part of the other player.

White: Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (Korea)

Black: Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan)

Played on 28 April 2003.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *A battle of weak groups*

The players take it in turns to take corner profit, then to create weak groups.

Figure 2 (51-100). *Misplacing one group may be an accident, misplacing two . . .*

Giving Black a ponnuki with 55 and 57 is a very resolute way for White to play. 'Surely it's bad,' said Ishida. However, Yuki seemed to be affected by an excess of fighting spirit. 'I was determined not to play even one slack move,' he said. Because of this, he rushed straight ahead, neglecting to make a necessary forcing move — Black 67 — before playing 63. The result was that his ponnuki was captured! Then, up to 84, a whole group!

Yuki: 'I didn't sacrifice the group. It was captured. After this, I played with a feeling of desperation.'

Black 89. Black's only hope now is to capture everything.




Figure 2 (51-100)




Figure 3 (101-142)

36: throws in (at 30); 37: takes (at 32)

Figure 3 (101-142). *The proverb is a false friend.*

'Big groups don't die,' according to the proverb. Song probably never dreamed that his group was in any danger.

Figure 4 (143-183). *Nowhere to run*

Things are now looking pretty desperate for the white group. A second eye is not to be had for love or money.

White 66. *Dia. 1* shows that White can't cut, as he can't connect after 6 (if 3 at 5, 4 at 6).

White resigns after Black 183.

(Go Weekly, 26 May 2003)





Figure 4 (143-183)

49: retakes; 74: ko



Dia. 1

5. Cho U vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho

White: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Cho U 8-dan (Chinese Taipei)

Played on 29 April 2003.

Commentary by O Meien Oza.

Figure 1 (1-54). The Yi style

This is Cho U's first game with the world's number one. He plays the mini-Chinese Opening with 1, 5, and 7, though it's well known that this opening has been studied and played more extensively in Korea than anywhere else.

Black 23. Cho is playing cautiously. Counterattacking with Black 35 immediately would be 'the usual strategy', according to O, who added that 'Black should be able to handle the fight'.

When Black does attack at 35, ten moves later, Yi counters with 36 to 54, 'a way of playing unique to Yi'. O: 'If anyone but Yi played this way, he would be laughed at.' White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* look more stylish.

However, Cho U commented that he didn't feel happy with his game when White settled himself up to 54.





Figure 1 (1-54)



Dia. 1: the normal strategy?



Cho U: like Yamashita, he will get more international exposure now that he has won the Honinbo title. In the 13th Fujitsu Cup, he beat Ma Xiaochun, but lost to Mok Chin-seok in the quarterfinals.



Both Cho U and Yi Ch'ang-ho seem to be concentrating hard.




Figure 2 (55-100)

Figure 2 (55-100). Looking good for White

From 57 on, one feels that Cho is 'playing very inventively' (O). Black seems to achieve his aims in the fight up to 83, but when White plays at 84 the game is 'more promising for White'.

When White whittles the bottom area down to size with 92, 'the game feels very tough for Black'.

Black 95 is the highlight of the game. O: 'I'd never see this move. If I'd been the one playing the game, Black would have lost. Black 95 is the move that eventually leads to victory.'

Figure 3 (101-141). Brilliant play by Cho

The flow of the game suddenly changes. Seeing Yi fall back on the defensive like this is unbelievable. O: 'Cho displays to the full the sharpness of his reading, his strength in shinogi.'

Failing to block with A before living with 14 and 16 is an elementary blunder by Yi.

Black 21. Black now has the lead in territory.

Yi entrusts his fortunes to the contact play of 22, but Cho plays brilliantly in settling his group. O: 'Black 31 is clever. This is a good shinogi.'




Figure 3 (101-141)

Figure 4 (142-185). A good win for Cho

White 44 is the biggest point on the board, but

locally White had to reinforce at 46. Following 45 with the simple atari of 49 is 'exquisite — the knock-out punch' (O).






Figure 4 (142-185)



Dia. 2: can't cut



Dia. 3: even worse

White 50. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 2, Black plays 2 etc., and White can't cut. Changing 3 to 3 in Dia. 3 doesn't help.

Capturing with 55 gives Black a big lead.

This was an excellent game for Cho. We look forward to further encounters between these two.

White resigns after Black 185.

(Go Weekly, 19 May 2003.)

6. Yoda vs. Dong

To finish off, here is a Japan-China game. Dong Yan is not very well known outside China. Born in 1977, he has been a member of the top group of players for several years. He came second in the Tianyuan title in 2000. He earned his place on the Chinese team for the CSK Cup in a qualifying tournament. In contrast to the typical Chinese fondness for territory, he favours thickness.

White: Dong Yan 7-dan (China)

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan)

Played on 29 April 2003.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-25)

Figure 1 (1-25). A dubious opening strategy

Yoda tries a special strategy early on with 9. Dong responds by switching to 10. Each side goes his own way with 11 and 12. Ishida: 'At a glance, this looks better for Black.' Black makes good shape on the right side, while you can't say that 7 has been turned into a bad move. The reason is that Black can still seek sabaki by blocking at A.

To an amateur, White 24 looks like an ordinary move, but Ishida had reservations. 'This is surprising. One would be reluctant to play here.'

He advocated extending as far as B, making miai of C and 24. He called this 'the usual approach'.

The checking extension of 25 works perfectly.




Figure 2 (26-60)

Figure 2 (26-60). *An easy game for Black*

Black 27 sets up a good pressing move at A for later.

White 32 may be the proper move, but it lets Black develop a position at the bottom with 33 and 35. That means that Black has set up a double-wing formation anchored on his bottom left corner enclosure. Ishida: 'In the twinkling of an eye, Black has set up a nice position. My feeling is that White has invested too many stones on the top. If you let Yoda get off to such a good start, it's far from easy to overtake him.'

The focus switches back to the top with 36. Yoda settles himself with the flowing sequence to 47. Black 49 is a good answer to the cut of 48. White 50 to 54 feel like a desperation measure. Instead of 50, White would like to extend at 53, but Black will defend with B; he threatens to cut at C next. If anything, the balance of power favours Black. Ishida: 'It's not an exaggeration to say that Black is already winning.'

White has no choice but to invade at 56 and go on a rampage.

Figure 3 (61-100). *Black keeps the lead.*

Black 87 is a shrewd move: it eliminates Black's bad aji while stealing White's eye shape.

Black 97 is a proclamation of victory. Though realizing it is unreasonable, White launches one last challenge with 100.

Figure 4 (101-161). *Dong is outmatched.*

Black 13. Black could have won with the safety-first move of A, but fighting spirit makes him decide to try to bring down the group.




Figure 3 (61-100)

95: connects




Figure 4 (101-161)

37: ko

White resigns after Black 161.

(Go Weekly, 26 May 2003. Translated by John Power.)

The 7th LG Cup Final: Yi vs. Yi

Korean players have dominated the LG Cup, winning it four times out of six. Three of those wins were scored by Yi Ch'ang-ho, who has been the standard bearer for Korean go since the early 90s. However, a powerful rival has emerged, the first player younger than Yi who might have the potential to rival his achievements. This is Yi Se-tol. The first clash between the two Yis in the final of an international tournament came in the 5th LG Cup. On that occasion, the younger Yi started brilliantly, winning the first two games, but then the older Yi made a great comeback to take the title 3-2.

This time things were different. Below we present all the games from the title match. Except for the last game, only very brief commentaries were available to us, but the games are still very entertaining.

Game One

White: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Yi Se-tol 3-dan (Korea)

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each.

Played in Seoul on 25 February 2003.




Figure 1 (1-53)

Figure 1 (1-53). *Splendid isolation*

The question of what will happen to White 28 is the focus of the opening.

After setting his left-side stone in motion with 37, Black blocks off the centre with 45 and 47, then cuts off the escape route of 28 with 49 to 53.

Figure 2 (54-81). *Desperately seeking sabaki*

White sets out to secure sabaki, starting with the contact plays at 54 and 56. Black 71, a solid extension at the vital point, feels good. Black presses White hard with 75 to 81.

Figure 3 (82-100). *Sacrifice strategy*

White switches direction with 82.




Figure 2 (54-81)




Figure 3 (82-100)

White's strategy is to sacrifice the bottom centre group in return for swallowing up the left side.

Game Two

White: Yi Se-tol

Black: Yi Ch'ang-ho

Played in Seoul on 27 February 2003.





Figure 4 (101-149)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 4 (101-149). *A deadly wedge*

White's strategy seems to have more or less worked when the game is rudely cut short by the wedge in at 49. White has no answer. If 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black captures three stones, which is enough. If on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black forces with 2; 4 then creates two cutting points.

White resigns after Black 149.

(*Go Weekly*, 31 March 2003)



First blood to Se-tol




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *A quiet start*

After the exchange of one-space jumps, the cap of 25 is effective.

Black links up all his groups in the left half of the board.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *A purely territorial contest*

The game continues without any real fighting. Black 95 is an excellent point.

Figure 3 (101–149). *Black coasts to a win.*

In the ko fight after 34, Black's successive moves at 39 and 41 are enough to secure victory.

By coincidence, this game had the same number of moves as the first one.

White resigns after Black 149.

(Go Weekly, 31 March 2003)




Figure 3 (101–149)

38: ko

Game Three

White: Yi Ch'ang-ho

Black: Yi Se-tol

Played in Seoul on 25 March 2003.





Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). *White's bad start*

Black 17 is one of Se-tol's favourite strategies.



Dia. 1: better for White

White's play from 24 to 30 is below par. Perhaps Ch'ang-ho overlooked 31. Instead of 24, White should follow *Dia. 1*, which would give an even game.

Black already has the lead after 31 and 33: White has just played dame points. After this, White doesn't manage to get back into the game. It's very unusual for Ch'ang-ho to make such a bad start.





Figure 2 (51–100)



Dia. 2: the game is decided

Figure 2 (51–100). *A missed opportunity*

Black 89. The game would have been over if Black had followed *Dia. 2*.




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 3 (101-150). Complications

Despite the comment earlier that this game was decided in the opening, there's still a lot of hectic fighting left in it. Black just manages to keep one step ahead of White.




Figure 4 (151-200)

Figure 4 (151-200). White's defiance

White 86 is a defiant move: White takes profit and is prepared to fight a ko at the bottom.

Figure 5 (201-265). Black wraps it up.

Large-scale trades take place, but it is clear that Black always has the initiative. The amount of fighting in this game more than made up for the peaceful second game.

White resigns after Black 265.

(Go Weekly, 14 April 2003)




Figure 5 (201-265)

ko (over 11): 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32;
37: ko (above 12); 39: connects (above 31);
40: ko (right of 19); 43: ko (at 19); 46: ko: right
of 19); 60: ko (left of 55); 63: ko

Game Four

White: Yi Se-tol

Black: Yi Ch'ang-ho

Played in Seoul on 27 March 2003.

Report by Oshima Masao.




Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50). Another bad start for Ch'ang-ho

Although the board orientation is different, the opening to 12 is the same as in the third game. Ch'ang-ho makes a change with 13.

Black 39. This reducing move goes in too deep, according to Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, who gave a live commentary on TV. Instead, Black 40 or A would be appropriate, he said. Rui Naiwei commented: 'Black 39 is a kind of do-or-die strategy, which is unlike Yi Ch'ang-ho, who usually favours drawn-out games with the issue decided in the endgame.'

Black 41. After the game, Ch'ang-ho commented that he should have followed *Dia. 1*.

Black 49, at 35 minutes 10 seconds, was the slowest move of the game. In fact, the hane of White 48 has put Black on the spot.



Dia. 1: better for Black




Figure 2 (51-100)

65: ko; 70: takes three stones; 88: ko (at 60);
90: ko (at 82); 99: ko (at 87)


Figure 2 (51-100). White takes the lead, then gives it back.

A trade follows up to 77, but this result, with his top left group being swallowed up, is bad for Black. He is behind.

Next, it's Se-tol's turn to go wrong. He starts a large-scale ko fight with 92...

Before looking at the result of the fight, here is what Se-tol should have done, according to Ch'ang-ho.

Dia. 2. If White simply plays 1 to 5, he has the lead.



Dia. 2: better for White 92




Figure 3 (101-120)


5: ko (right of 2)

Figure 3 (101-120). White falls behind.

The ko fight ends in a trade with 6 to 8, but all the stones White has played at the bottom have become *mochikomi*, that is, a loss without compensation, so White's lead is upset when Black plays 9.

Black 13. 'This is a good move,' commented Kim In 9-dan. 'Black is leading.'

Since he is behind, White launches a violent attack, trying to break through the top with 14 and 16. Ch'ang-ho regretted Black 19, saying he should have followed *Dia. 3*. The reason becomes clear in the next figure.



Dia. 3: second thoughts




Figure 4 (121-163)

Figure 4 (121-163). A second upset

Ch'ang-ho regretted missing *Dia. 3* because the continuation in the game made his group at the top quite thin. He was so preoccupied with this group that he didn't realize that his opponent was planning to pull off something at the bottom.

The stones at the bottom seem beyond hope, but Se-tol carefully sets a trap with 44 to 50. Once Black connects at 51, White can set his stones in motion. His play here shows that Se-tol is a born fighter. Getting a ko up to 63 means that yet another upset has taken place.

If Black had played 47 or 49 at 50, there would have been no problem. Ch'ang-ho also commented that he should have played 51 at A.




Figure 5 (164-200) ko (over 66): 69, 72, 75, 78; 80: connects (left of 66); ko (over 87): 90, 93, 96; 98: connects (at 91); 99: ko (at 87)

Figure 5 (164-200). The game is decided.

With 81, a trade is completed, but now Black has no hope of winning.




Figure 6 (201-250)

ko: 5, 8; 45: ko (above 42); 46: connects (at 3)





Figure 7 (251-292)

White wins and connects the ko above 88.



Dia. 4

Figure 6 (201-250), Figure 7 (251-292)

Black 73. If omitted, Black can't capture the throw-in at 1 in *Dia. 4*.

White wins by 7½ points.



The referee confirms the score.

After the game ended, there was a joint press conference, which is unusual in a world championship. At first, most of the questions were directed at Ch'ang-ho: the reporters wanted to know his opinion of Se-tol. The former answered forthrightly. 'My opponent was too strong. From now on, it may be hard for me to win against him.' When asked about Se-tol's strong points: 'He has a very keen competitive insight. His game is well balanced — he has no weaknesses.'

By winning this match, Se-tol put a large dent in Ch'ang-ho's aura of invincibility in world championship finals. Before this match, he had lost only one final out of the 16 in which he had played. One of the professionals reviewing the game while it was being played commented: 'Yi Ch'ang-ho probably understands how Cho Hunhyeon felt.'

(*Go Weekly*, 14 April 2003. LG report translated by John Power.)



Se-tol and Ch'ang-ho at the press conference

The 16th Fujitsu Cup: Another Triumph for Yi Se-tol

With his victory in the 16th Fujitsu Cup, the 20-year-old Yi Se-tol took a big step towards achieving his ambition: establishing himself as the world's number one player. He became one of the few players to hold two international titles concurrently — he also won the 7th LG Cup. He still has a long way to go to catch up with Yi Ch'ang-ho, but he has made a good start.

His opponent in the final was an even younger player, the 16-year-old Song T'ae-kon, who is the latest prodigy to emerge in Korea. Reaching the final was Song's best performance yet in an international tournament, and he showed that he is going to be a major presence in the future.

In this report, we present the semifinals and the final.

Semifinal 1: Song vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho

In the long term, the main significance of this year's Fujitsu Cup may turn out to be not Yi Se-tol's success but the emergence of Song T'ae-kon. His performance in reaching the final at the age of 16 has been bested only by Yi Ch'ang-ho, who, of course, won his first world title at the same age (it was the 3rd Tong Yang Securities Cup back in 1992).

Here is Song's semifinal win against that same player.

White: Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (Korea)

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each (last five minutes are allotted to byo-yomi).

Played on 5 July 2003.

Adapted from a report by Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan. Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–50). A Korean joseki

White 10 is unusual in Japan (White 12 immediately is the joseki). Song took 20 minutes on 11, making it his slowest move of the game. He also thought for five minutes on 15, but the other moves to 21 were all played immediately. Kobayashi Satoru: 'I've never seen this sequence in Japan, but in Korea it's treated as a joseki.'

Black 21. Black could secure the top right side with 1 in *Dia. 1*, but being sealed in by White 2 would be unbearable. Later, White could aim at attacking at 'a'.






Figure 1 (1–50)



Dia. 1: good for White



Dia. 2: losing without fighting

Having given Black all the top, White has to take compensation by using his thickness to attack the top right corner with 22.

White 30 invites Black to push down with 31 and 35. This helps White to secure 4th-line terri-



The start of the semifinal between Yi and Song

tory on the side, but Black is satisfied with taking sente to attack with 37. Kobayashi: 'When he gets to play first at 37, I back Black. The continuation to 50 is what can be expected.'

Note that if White uses 38 to follow *Dia. 2*, he falls behind overall when Black occupies the empty corner with 6.




Figure 2 (51-100)
ko: 87, 90, 93, 96, 99


Figure 2 (51-100). Giving White territory

Black 51. Kobayashi: 'This shows a distinctive feel for go. Song considers this an urgent point, which has priority over a large move [the

empty corner]. This is slow-paced by the standards of the fast-paced Korean go world; he's more like a Japanese type of player, using thickness to overhaul the opponent. Black 53 is also a good move.'

With 52 and 60 to 64, White takes the large points, building a great arc. At this point (64), the game seems slightly easier for White: it doesn't look as if Black will be able to give the komi. However, Black 67 is a kind of do-or-die move; it's a factor in Song's win. As territory, it's nothing special, but it takes away White's eyes. If instead Black encloses the bottom with A, it's not clear that this will all become black territory. Kobayashi: 'Like 51, 67 shows Song's unique feel for go.'

When White invades at 68, Black has no choice but to defend at 69. If he used 69 to attack at 70, White would switch to B and live in the corner. Up to 74, a large section is sliced out of Black's moyo.



'Dia. 3: good for Black

Black is behind in territory, so he has to complicate the game and hope for a chance to attack in the centre. The low invasion of 77 is a

good move. If White counters with 1 in *Dia. 3* (previous page), Black will live large in the corner with 2 and 4.

Up to 85, Black lays waste to white territory, then starts a ko fight.





Figure 3 (101-125)
4: connects



Dia. 4: simpler *Dia. 5: better for White*

Figure 3 (101-125). *White wins the ko fight.*

When White finishes off the ko with 4, then settles his group up to 10, he takes the lead. However, Black does get sente to play the large endgame move of 11.

Black tries to stir things up with the invasion of 15. Yi now starts playing erratically.

White 20. White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* would keep things simple.

White 24 is funny. White should force with 1 in *Dia. 5*, then take territory with 3. Black's only option is to take aim at the centre group, but this group has various kinds of aji — it's not going to die.

Figure 4 (126-160). *An upset*

White takes gote up to 28, so Black gets to play the large point of 29. He has upset White's

lead. White doesn't lose any points in the subsequent endgame, so that means that White 24 in Figure 3 is the losing move.




Figure 4 (126-160)




Figure 5 (161-199)

Figure 5 (161-199). *The coup de grâce*

The game has been decided, but Yi fights on to set the scene for resignation.

Black 79 aims at 91, but, if White defends, Black will play at 90 next, making White's defeat certain. White prefers to go out fighting, countering with 80 and 82. When Black intercepts with 89, White 90, rather than being a do-or-die move, asks for the coup de grâce. Fighting a ko with 94 is unreasonable.

If White plays A after 99, Black captures the top left corner with B.

Yi Ch'ang-ho is known for his skill in wrapping up won games — he's long been the world's number one at this — so one has to give

all the more credit to Song for pulling off an upset. It may be too soon to say, but he could well be the third great Korean prodigy, following the two Yis.

White resigns after Black 199.

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*)

Semifinal 2: Yi Se-tol vs. Yoda

Japanese fans expected big things when four Japanese representatives reached the quarterfinals, but only one of them survived to secure a semifinal place. For various reasons, including a self-imposed moratorium and scheduling clashes with the Meijin title match, Yoda hasn't been very active on the international scene recently, but his good results in this tournament show that he is one of Japan's most formidable players.


His semifinal encounter with Yi produced a very difficult and complicated game that could have gone either way.

White: Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan)

Played on 5 July 2003.

Commentary by Kojima Takaho 9-dan, with reference to a commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.



Dia. 1: the usual idea

Figure 1 (1–36). Invasion and counter-invasion

As mentioned in the CSK article, Yoda likes to have black, as he can control the game. For his part, Yi used to focus mainly on fighting, but there are signs recently that he is developing into more of an all-round player. His formidable prowess as a fighter was well displayed in the game with Hane Naoki given in GW98.

Black 11. It takes courage to play this way, as White 10 and 12 turn 5 into a bad move and make White thick. In return, Black develops rapidly and takes the good point of 13. Instead of

11, the usual strategy would be to follow *Dia. 1*.






Figure 1 (1–36)



Dia. 2: good for White



Dia. 3: forestalling White 36

White 14 is a good point. If Black responds with 2 in *Dia. 2*, White makes shape with 3 and 5. If White played 1 at 'a', Black 'b' would be just right (Ishida).

Instead of playing a checking extension, Black switches to 15, taking corner profit. White then extends to 24, so, when Black plays 25, he jumps to 26, focussing on his left-side moyo.

Black invades at 27: he is aiming at A.

Black 33. Black mustn't let the two white groups link up too easily. However, his peep at 31 has strengthened White, making it easy for him to invade at 34 (as he has 36). Black could have considered omitting the peep, simply jumping to 33 with 31.

Black 35 seems to invite 36. Black could have forestalled this move by following *Dia. 3* (Ishida).





Figure 2 (37-52)



Dia. 4: captured

Figure 2 (37-52). Yi has a surprise for Yoda.

The moves from 37 to 41 are a one-way street. Yi now plays a clever move with 42. Usually White ataries at 45, in which case Black cuts at 44, starting a ko in which the burden on White is heavier; alternatively, White connects at 44, and Black links up with A — the cut-off black stone is light. Black is satisfied either way.

When White cuts at 46, Black has to escape with 47. When Black played 37, he may have overlooked White 42. White 48 works perfectly: when White presses here, Black loses his freedom of action. Perhaps instead of 37 Black should have tried something different, attacking White with B or playing C or D at the bottom.

Black 49. Black would like to extend at 1 in Dia. 4 and aim at attacking at 'a'; unfortunately, he loses his stones when White hanes at 2.

White 52 is another good move.

Figure 3 (53-84). Black under heavy pressure

When White plays 52 (in Figure 2), Black is faced with a dilemma. He has to play 57 before White, but he also has to look after his weak centre group; he also has a weak group on the side.






Figure 3 (53-84)

76: connects (at 71); 78: connects (at 53)



Dia. 5: too good for White



Dia. 6: better for White


Black 53 is an emergency measure to take sente. Instead, exchanging 1 for White 2 in Dia. 5 would be painful; moreover, it's gote, as Black has to play 3 and 5. White therefore gets to block at 6; after 8, White can block at 'a' in sente, so this group is safe. Black also has to worry about his top left corner.

Black achieves his aim of playing 57, but things remain tough for him after White 58. The only consolation for him is that White's centre top group is also weak.

Black switches to 59. White 66 is a slip — if White follows *Dia. 6*, Black is left with more cutting points than he can patch up.

Black's position improves a little when he squeezes with 71 to 75, then plays 77 in sente.

White 80 to 84 show Yi's distinctive approach: these moves try to turn 79 into a bad move. *Dia. 7* shows the usual strategy.



Dia. 7: the usual strategy




Figure 4 (85-111)


Figure 4 (85-111). Yoda's resolute decision

Black 85 to 89 astonished the spectators. Black helps White to drive a wedge between his stones, which is usually taboo. This strategy represents a 'resolute decision' (Kojima) by Yoda. The advantage for Black is that he settles one of his weak groups; moreover, White can't omit 90, so Black gets sente to play 91. If Black can settle this group without adversely affecting any other group, the game will be promising for him.


Black 109 is better left unplayed. If Black has the atari of A, then the wedge of White B won't be sente.

Black 111 is a good move. With *shinogi* in sight, the game is clearly good for Black. Note that White must not counter with a hane. If White 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black gets a ko. Likewise, if White plays the other hane, Black starts to build eye shape with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 9*.

Incidentally, Yoda went into byo-yomi on 111. Yi, always a fast player, still had over one hour 40 minutes left.



Dia. 8: good for Black



Dia. 9: eye shape




Figure 5 (112-150)

Figure 5 (112-150). No eyes in sight

Black 19 is a little cheeky, as it lets White cut off the centre group.

White 30 is a do-or-die move. The two-stone sacrifice loses quite a few points, but in exchange White gets a sente eye at A. Having secured the life of his group, White launches a large-scale attack with 34. Black's group has only one eye. The players following the game couldn't find a way for Black to live.

Black 43 is a sacrifice to create sente moves, but Black seems to run out of steam after White 50.



Yoda looked determined at the beginning of the game, but . . .





Figure 6 (151–154)

Figure 6 (151–154). *Yi lets Yoda off the hook.*

White 54 is an inexplicable slip: thanks to his all-out play and Black's greed with 19 in Figure 5, White had the black group at his mercy.

Dia. 10. If White plays 1 to 5, the game is over. If Black cuts at 6, White gets a geta with 7 and 9, so his centre group is safe. If Black cuts at 10, White takes advantage of his earlier sacrifice

to make an eye in sente with 11, so he then secures life with 13. Black 14 and 16 don't do anything useful.



Dia. 10: White's chance





Figure 7 (155–200)



Dia. 11: White can't kill

Figure 7 (155–200). *A second upset*

Black 55 is a shrewd move — Yoda doesn't spurn his opponent's kindness in helping him to



... was bitterly disappointed to end up on the wrong side of a half-pointer.


his feet after almost knocking him out. Giving up his centre group is a price he can afford to pay in return for living with the large group.

White 64. White can no longer attempt to capture Black by playing 5 in *Dia. 10*, as Black cuts at 6 and captures his centre group. Even if White tries 1 in *Dia. 11*, Black has a good peep at 4. He will have no trouble living after 8.


When Yoda played 65, he was probably confident of winning. His centre group is a loss of around 30 points (offset a little by the extra stones White had to play at 64 and later at 70), but he gained nearly 20 points from White's sacrifice in the top left; he has also gained from playing first on the right side with 71 to 75. Black has a definite lead.

White 76 was Yi's slowest move of the game: 11 minutes. The immediate concern of both players is the top right corner, but the real focus of the endgame is the cut at 90. At this point, Black can counter as in *Dia. 12* (Ishida).

Black 77 doesn't eliminate the bad corner aji. Black should play either one line to the right or at 99. In the case of the latter move, the idea would be to let White live in the corner if he peeps at 78 but to secure all the side territory.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

White 78 is perfectly timed. If Black answers at 85, White lives easily with White 79—Black A—White B; however, Black 79 gives White a lot of aji to play with.

White 80 is a tricky move. If Black plays 83 at 1 in *Dia. 13*, he can't stop White from pulling off something in the corner after 8.

Success is within White's grasp when he extends at 86. Now Black can't counter the cut of 90 by trying to capture. The result would be a ko, as shown in *Dia. 14* (next page), and Black doesn't have the requisite ko threats.



Dia. 14: an unwinnable ko

For the second time, the lead changes hands.

Figure 8 (201–250). A half-point lead

Although White has the lead, it is by a bare half point. The players following the game became aware of this with a shock — despite Yoda's setback on the right side, everyone had assumed that he'd hung on to a lead.

The ironical thing about this game is that White is able to fight the ko at 28 right to the end and win it. Normally, that would be unreasonable, as it's a one-sided ko, with only White having a lot at stake. In this game, however, he has such a superiority in ko threats that he can pull it off.




Figure 8 (201–250)
ko: 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46

Figure 8 (251–304). A wealth of ko threats

The players fight it out to the bitter end, but there is no overcoming White's profusion of ko threats.

After the game, Yi commented: 'I was lucky

to pick up a win.' Yoda certainly seemed to have it in the bag at one stage, but in the first half of the game Yi had clearly outplayed him, so maybe the result was poetic justice.




Figure 9 (251–304)
ko: 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82; 86: connects (at 61); 102: ko (at 92); 104: connects (at 99)

This was Yi's toughest game of the tournament. For his part, Yoda was so disheartened by his loss that he was unable to regain his fighting spirit for the play-off for 3rd place, held two days later.

Once again, the stage was set for an all-Korean final, for the fourth year in a row.

White wins by ½ point.

(Adapted from the *Yomiuri Newspaper* and *Monthly Go World*, August 2003)



Yi reaches the final for the second year in a row.

The final: Yi Se-tol vs. Song

White: Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (Korea)

Played on 7 July 2003.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

Song was the youngest finalist ever in the Fujitsu Cup — this was one tournament that Yi Ch'ang-ho failed to win as a teenager. However, Song showed obvious signs of nervousness in the final, in contrast to Yi Se-tol, who looked quite relaxed. He and Song are good friends, and Yi commented later: 'In a sense, with both finalists being from the same country, there was a family-like atmosphere.' Actually, on his visits to Japan Song had had trouble coping with the solitude of staying by himself in a hotel room. The night before the semifinal, he'd been unable to sleep and had asked Yi Se-tol to let him stay the night in his room. This was out of the question the night before the final, however, but we don't know how Song managed.

As for go style, Ishida Yoshio commented that Song is an all-rounder with a balanced style who can handle any kind of game.




Figure 1 (1-42)


Figure 1 (1-42). An even start

The patient move of White 16 has become popular in recent years. If White follows the joseki in *Dia. 1*, Black gets to play both at the bottom and on the side.


The exchange from 35 to 40 is interesting, as it shows the fuseki styles of the players.

the capture of the white stone. Moreover, the thickness Black builds here is cancelled out by


White's influence in the top left.



Dia. 1: the old joseki



Dia. 2: Black unhappy



Dia. 3: good for Black

The way Song plays show his feeling for balance. In response to 39, Yi tenukies, switching to the large point of 40. He is playing lightly. If instead White connects at 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black will cut at 2. After 5, Black will switch to 'a', which would make A in the figure a threat.

The position is even. The invasion of 42 starts the decisive fight of the game.



Song plays in his first international final.





Figure 2 (43-59)



Dia. 4: a close game

Figure 2 (43-59). Unreasonable aggression

Black seals White in with 43. The sequence to 52 has virtually become a joseki. Locally, White doesn't have two eyes, but attempting to kill him, as Song does with 59, is regarded as difficult, if not unreasonable.

Virtually the same sequence as here came up in a game between Yi Ch'ang-ho and Chang Hao (White) in the 6th Samsung Cup in 2001. In that game, White's group was captured (though Chang turned it into a sacrifice), but a big difference from that game is that Yi had a stone at A.

Ishida: 'Going by the result, Black's strategy in trying to capture White was unreasonable. Using 59 to reinforce at 1 in Dia. 4 (previous page), letting White live, would have been good enough. The game is a close contest after 7.' (Note that 2 could also be at 'a'.)






Figure 3 (60-100)

ko: 82, 85, 88, 91, 94



Dia. 5: oi-otoshi



Dia. 6: not so easy to kill White

Figure 3 (60-100). White is untroubled.

Black 73 shows that Black has given up trying to kill White outright. If he wants to do so, he has to answer White 1 in Dia. 5 by connecting at 2, aiming at a *gomoku-nakade* (five-stone large eye), but White expands his eye space with 3, then sets up an *oi-otoshi* (capturing through successive ataris) up to 9.

To avoid this *oi-otoshi*, Black has to play 73 at 1 in Dia. 6. White plays 2, and now Black gets his *gomoku-nakade*, but White gets a lot of liberties. White 6 is sente (if Black ignores it, the capturing race is over in a flash after White 'a'); White then steals Black's eye shape with 10. White has plenty of sente moves against the cen-

tre black group, so this fight will probably be too much for Black.

Black 73 to 81 is more reasonable. This sets up a ko, but, with the cuts already made on the outside by White, Black can't expect to win it.

The successive moves of 93 and 95 don't eliminate all the bad aji in Black's position. However, White doesn't play with sufficient attention to detail: he should force with 98 before ending the ko with 96. In that case, Black would answer at A and would be shorter of liberties than in the game. White B-Black C-White D would then be a potent threat.

Once White has lived, the two black stones are not so important, so Black answers 98 with 99. This strengthens the corner group, nullifying the threat of White E.




Figure 4 (101-132)

Figure 4 (101-132). *Do-or-die moves by Song*

When White lives at the bottom, Black is clearly behind, so he plays a series of do-or-die moves. The first is Black 3. The safety-first move would be Black A, but that would let White defend the left side with 20. Black 3 gives White a chance to come out with 6.

Black 19 is another do-or-die move. Usually you would expect Black B, but Black would have no chance of winning after White 20.

Song's all-out play gives Yi a chance to shine. White 32 is severe. In response, Black C is the shape move, but White D will give him a jolt; Black can't fight a ko with E, as he doesn't have enough ko threats.

Figure 5 (133-160). *A final challenge*

Yi's only worry is that his bottom left group

doesn't have definite eye shape, which is why he defends at 44. If Black answers at 52, White A becomes sente, so White is alive.





Figure 5 (133-160)
ko: 56, 59



Dia. 7: gote

Black 47 is Song's third do-or-die move. If instead Black defends on the left side with 49, White plays 47, simplifying the game. Black invites White to fight a ko; if he wins it, he may be able to exploit White's thinness around B.

This is the last significant fight of the game, but in a sense Black is just asking White to administer the coup de grâce. White has ko threats in the bottom left, so Black can't win this ko.

White 58 is a clever answer to 57: White takes profit. Even if Black cuts (as he does with 63 in Figure 6), White can live, as he has reduced Black's centre liberties. Actually, Black didn't want to play 57, but he had no choice because of his shortage of ko threats.

White 60 is a nasty ko threat. Black would like to answer at 1 in Dia. 7, but then cutting with 3 becomes gote — after 8, White has 'a'.



Song and Yi review the game.





Figure 6 (161-204)
ko: 67, 70, 73

Figure 6 (161-204). Experience tells.

Black has no choice about 61, though that gives White ko threats at 68 and 74. As he's out of ko threats, Black finishes off the ko with 75 and 77, but White captures the bottom group. The game is over.

Just for reference, if Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White doesn't have two eyes, but he easily wins the capturing race.



Dia. 8: White wins

Song plays on just to set the scene for resignation. In theory, his attack at the top aims at swallowing up the white group. Cutting at 93 prevents White from linking up with White A-Black B-White C.

Black can't hope to catch the white group at the top *and* look after his centre bottom group, so Song finally resigns after White 204.


Yi: 'This is my first successive victory in any tournament, including domestic Korean titles, so I'm really happy. I want to become so strong that everyone says Yi Se-tol is the world's strongest player.'

(*Monthly Go World*, September 2003 & the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. Translated by John Power.)

Fujisawa Shuko's Brilliant Tesujis


Fujisawa Shuko is one of the most imaginative players of his generation. His games abound with interesting and unexpected moves. His greatest achievement was winning the Kisei title for six successive terms (from 1977 to 1982), earning him the title of Honorary Kisei.

Position 1. White to Play




This position arose in the 1963 Meijin title match. Sakata Eio (black) was the challenger. Black has erased White's moyo at the bottom, so Black seems to be in the lead. But the stones defending Black's territory on the right are a bit thin. Where did Fujisawa play?

Position 2. White to Play




This game is taken from the 1975 Tengen title match. Fujisawa's opponent is Ohira Shuzo (black). White's stones in the lower right corner don't have eyes. How did Fujisawa take care of these stones?

Position 3. White to play



In this game, taken from the 1974 Meijin league, Fujisawa's opponent is Ishida Yoshio (black). Fujisawa invaded Black's moyo at the top with White 1 and Black went on the attack with 2. How did Fujisawa continue?


Problem 4. Black to play



This game is taken from the first (1976) Kisei tournament. If Takemiya Masaki (white) can secure the lower left corner, he will win. Black's problem is to find the best way to fight there. How did Fujisawa play?


Fujisawa's Brilliant Tesujis (Answers)

Position 1



Dia. 1. How Fujisawa played.


The attachment of White 1 in *Dia. 1* was a brilliant move. White turned with 2, but White broke into the right side with the sequence to White 7. Black had to defend with 8, so White used his sente to play 9 at the bottom. The game is now quite fluid and it is hard to tell which side has the advantage.



Dia. 2. Black's failure


If Black defends the right side with 2 in *Dia. 2*, White will wedge in with 3. Black cuts with 4, but, after White descends to 5, Black cannot avoid a big loss on the right side.

Position 2




Dia. 1. How Fujisawa played.

White attached with 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black had no choice but to block with 2, but White draws back with 3, leaving behind the cut at A. Because of this cut, White's stones in the corner will have no problem living.



Dia. 2. Black's failure (1)


If Black tries to engulf the white stone with 2 in *Dia. 2*, White will extend to 3 and 5. The points A and B are now miai. Not only do White's stones live, but he has also taken away a lot of black territory.



Dia. 3. Black's failure (2)


Black might answer White 1 by extending to 2 in *Dia. 3*. This also leads to Black's failure. White first exchanges 3 for Black 4, then traps the three black stones with 5.

Position 4



Dia. 4. Escaping is not an option for White.


White could escape with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, linking up to his stones in the center, but Black would simply follow him out with 2 and 4. White is now unable to defend his territory in the center and the territory in the lower right corner is up for grabs.



Dia. 1. How Fujisawa played.


Fujisawa played the knight's move of Black 1. This made the points A and B miai. If White blocks at A, White will descend to B and live in the corner.

Position 3



Dia. 1. How Fujisawa played.

Fujisawa attached with White 1. When Black hane with 2, White crosscut with 3, enabling him to make the forcing moves of 5 and 7. Next, White again attached with 9 and crosscut with 11. Black had to atari with 12, but White 13 forced Black to capture with 14. Finally, White drew back with 15 and Black's moyo at the top was erased.



Dia. 2

In the game, White played to secure the corner with 2 and 4. Black played the knight's move of 5, creating a link with his stones above and mapping out territory on the left side. After White exchanged 6 for Black 7, White had to capture with 8 to secure his stones. If White omitted this move, Black could atari with A, depriving the white stones of their eye shape. Later, Black played B, securing the territory on the right side.

The 27th Kisei Title Match

O Rissei vs. Yamashita

Below, we complete our coverage of the Kisei title match from the last issue.

Game Three

White: Yamashita Keigo 7-dan

Black: O Rissei Kisei

Komi: 5½ points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on 5 & 6 February 2003.

Commentary is based on comments by Yoshio Ishida 9-dan, interpreted and compiled by Rob van Zeijst.

Figure 1 (1–31). *Influence vs. profit*

Just as in the first game, O Rissei, playing with the black stones, goes for profit while Yamashita adopts a moyo strategy.




Figure 1 (1–31)

In response to 8, Black usually exchanges A for B before invading the corner with 9. Omitting this exchange is better for Black. However, after Black 9 there is no telling how White will answer. Blocking at 11 instead of 10 leads to a fight. White keeps the game simple and peaceful when he answers at 10. A possible reason for Yamashita's choice is that he wanted to switch to 12 and set up a moyo.


After 12, White's next move is often played at C, making Black D a good approach. In playing 14, White is planning to fight at the top as well as on the left side. If Black doesn't deal with this situation immediately, White 16 threatens to dominate

the whole upper left quadrant. For this reason Black 15 feels good — it forces White to choose between the corner and the left side. Black 19 is a good move when the ladder is favorable for him. See *Dia. 1* and 2 below.


To avoid getting cut, White jumps to 20, allowing Black to live comfortably with 21, 23, and later 27.

However, White sets up a huge moyo with 24. Since 26 is such a good move, Black might have been better off playing 25 at E. Black's failure becomes evident when he has to switch course in midstream with 31. See *Dia. 3*. The exchange of 29 for White 30 is clearly bad for Black.

Dia. 1. After Black 1, if White blocks at 2, the two-step hane of 3 and 9 is a strong combination. Since the ladder is favorable for Black, he can first exchange 5 for White 8 to make Black 9 even nastier.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White tries to capture with 10 and 12, Black plays the combination of 13 through 21, making miai of setting up a ladder with A and cutting with B. Either way it is clear White has failed.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. After White 2, Black 3 and 5 are natural. However, if Black has no confidence in his position after White 6 (this move could also be played at A), Black shouldn't play 1 in the first place. He probably should have played around B right away.





Figure 2 (32-67)

Figure 2 (32-67). Surviving an attack


In response to Black's invasion (the marked stone), capping with White 32 is the only move. Black 33 aims at White's weaknesses, but White 34 is a good defense because it hits the vital point of Black's shape. Black 35 partially defends against this threat, but White takes sente to clamp with 42 and 44. The moves through 50 follow naturally. Attaching with Black 51 next is good style. He should definitely not follow *Dia. 4*.

White 52 is a good move. Following *Dia. 5* falls into Black's trap — this diagram also provides an insight in the reason why Black plays at 53 instead of connecting at 54. The sequence of 51 through 58 shows superb technique by both players. White sacrifices two stones but gets the splendid hane of 58. As White's thickness is overwhelming, Black can no longer delay reinforcing his center stones with 59 through 67, the sealed move on the first day.

Dia. 4. Black 1 may seem natural, but it lacks spunk. White will be only too happy to play at 2 and 4. Black now has two weak groups. Also note that Black can cut only with A—Black B—White C, and Black can atari at D. Black ends with bad shape (the stone at 1 makes an empty triangle). That, in short, is the reason Black 1 is bad style.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. If White answers Black 1 by cutting at 2, Black 3 makes good shape in combination with 5. In addition, Black can force A to cut White's stones in sente. In the game, White plays B, hoping Black will answer at C. In that case, White no longer needs to connect at 4 but can extend to D, giving him a better result than this diagram.





Figure 3 (68-109)

Figure 3 (68-109). The territorial balance is broken.

Playing an approach with Black 68 from this side is the right direction. But why does Black answer at 69? Allowing a second approach at 70 seems incomprehensible. However, *Dia. 6* makes the logic of this clear. After White 70, Black has a plan to live quickly in the corner. White prevents this by sliding into the corner with 72. However,


this is a mistake (See *Dia. 7*.) In the sequence 73 through 87, the balance of territory has been broken and White is in serious trouble.

White tries to increase the scale of his moyo with 88 through 92, but this only makes things worse. He should have played at A to try to turn the whole lower right corner into territory. Because White didn't play this move, Black was easily able to make sabaki when he started moving out with his stones from 93. White could do little to prevent Black from making a living shape through 109.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. In response to the marked white stone, if Black defends with 1, White will extend all the way to 2. Even if this move does not constitute a direct threat to the corner, it makes White A sente — Black has to defend at B. This exchange extinguishes any aji that the marked black stone has. Because Black wants to keep this aji alive, he plays at 69 in the actual game. Ishida: 'It is a move that I heartily approve of.'



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. White should let Black live with 1 and 3, then build influence with 4. These moves also pro-

tect against a possible black cut with 5 and 7. After Black 9, White 10 through 14 make miai of capturing the two black cutting stones with A and the sequence White B-Black C-White D, which leads to a ko in the corner.




Figure 4 (110-158)
125: at the marked stone


Figure 4 (110-158). Reining in Yamashita's power

In general, Yamashita's attacks are vigorous and dangerous when they hit the right spot, but O was able to suppress all of his attacks before they could do any real damage. A case in point: when White splits Black's group with 10 and threatens to take away his eyes, Black's moves through 19 definitely make life with one group while also helping his center group. This is because it turns 53 into a good move, which threatens to either connect to Black's other group or make an eye with A, which is sente, and B.

White 20 is a large endgame move that also threatens the black group in the center. However, Black 21 is a good answer, inviting the cut at 24. This move allows Black to live in sente with 27, enabling him to take the large endgame sequences of 29 to 31 and 33 through 37 in sente. Now he can switch to 39, the last large endgame move. Black is now definitely in the lead. Of course, Black has analyzed the situation in the center and he has determined that his group there won't die.


However, Black 45 is a mistake. The moves through 51 are a safe way of playing, but aji is left at C. Instead of 45, *Dia. 8* would have been better.

Why did Black respond to White 52 with 53? The answer can be found in *Dia. 9*.



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Black 1 is a better response to White's marked move (White 44). If we assume the moves through 5, Black would next capture at 7 instead of connecting at A, which is the result (in a different order) in the game. This way White has no extra forcing move at B as in the game.



Dia. 9

Dia. 9. White played at A in the game. However, what would have happened if he had tried to go for the kill with 1? Black 2 would have been the correct response. To kill the black group White needs to play 3 and 5, but now Black plays 6 and 8, threatening to connect, and then 10. White has no answer to this move — if he connects the marked stone at B to prevent Black from getting his second eye, Black ataries at C—White D—Black E—White F—Black G and White is the one who is captured. It now becomes clear what

the inherent threat of White's move at A (52 in the actual game) was and why Black defended the way he did.




Figure 5 (159–200)

Figure 5 (159–200). Black clinches the game.

Black starts a sequence to break out and defend his lower side in sente. He uses this sente play the large endgame point at 73. White 74 is a tricky move. If Black inadvertently answers at A, White B threatens to connect the white stone at C. But if Black prevents this by playing at C himself, White D destroys the second eye, killing the whole black group. That means Black is forced to make a second eye immediately with 75 and 77.

White now starts the sequence from 78 to cut off one black stone. However, the exchange of White 80 for Black 81 offsets any points White gained in reaching this objective. In addition, Black plays some clever sente moves with 87 through 95 to keep the white center from expanding too much. The moves starting in this figure all the way to the end are more or less proper endgame moves without either side losing any points.

Figure 6 (200–242). Black wins by 4½ points.

Both players played the endgame correctly and the game ended 4½ points in Black's favor.

The game was decided in the lower right when White played at 72 in Figure 3. This brought on Black's sabaki and upset the territorial balance. White's last chance was playing at A instead of the sequence 88 through 92 in that figure.

From Monthly Go World, March 2003.




Figure 6 (200–242)

211: at 202; 242: at the marked stone

Game Four

White: O Rissei Kisei

Black: Yamashita Keigo 7-dan

Komi: 5½ points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on 19 & 20 February 2003.

Compiled by Rob van Zeijst, based on a commentary by Yoshio Ishida, 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1–18)


Figure 1 (1–18). Yamashita's innovation

After a bad start, O Rissei won Game Three to give him his first win against two losses. If he could win the fourth game, the flow of the match would be in his favor. However, O played an incredibly bad opening and Yamashita took full ad-

vantage of this windfall. Therefore, let's concentrate on the opening of this game.

Black 5 makes the first approach of opposing 3–4 point stones ('fighting komoku') on the left side. This is supposed to favor Black. However, after 7, O countered with the sequence White 8 through 10, one of his favorite josekis. Black 11 is correct style. White 14 is a move O often employs, deviating from the standard joseki shown in *Dia. 1*. In response, Black 15 is a new move. Black was clearly dissatisfied with the other options, shown in *Dias. 2* and 3. The main purpose of Yamashita's move is to avoid being sealed in by White A, but it also takes away a liberty from White's stones 12 and 14, preparing for Black to escape with his stone at 7.

White 16 next was questionable. This move does little to protect against the imminent threat of the escape of Black 7. Understandably, White is reluctant to play at B and revert to the joseki shown in *Dia. 1*. However, that would be the proper move. Black would probably then pincer at C. After White 16, Black has sente moves at and around D and he is strong in this neighborhood. That is the reason Black is able to omit a move around C, which does not fully protect the corner, in order to switch to 17, which does. Instead of 17, Black D is also good. However, Yamashita had a special plan prepared based on the assumption White would play at 18. And, even though White could see Black's next move coming, his only option is approaching with 18. So where is Black's next move that O has already anticipated?




Dia. 1


Dia. 1. In the standard joseki, by playing at 1, White firmly grabs hold of the marked cutting stone,

allowing Black to make the exchange 2 for 3 to build influence and to pincer the marked white stone with 4.

Dia. 2. The main variation after White 1 is the jump to Black 2. This is a tesuji that induces White 3 and 5. The sequence through 8 is the natural result, and it is regarded as even.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. However, in the actual game, after Black 4, White has a good move at 5 because the ladder is in his favor. Black has to oblige with 6, 8, and 10. Black has no chance to push once at 9, because after White A, Black's stones will be caught in a ladder. Not only is this result far superior to the variation in *Dia. 2*, but White has sente to switch to a move around F, in anticipation of the forcing sequence White B-Black C-White D-Black E.





Figure 2 (19-43)

Figure 2 (19-43). The beginning of the end


Black 19 is a strong move. Defending the corner with 29 or 27 is out of the question. Black's aim is to make White live on a small scale on the left side, while Black builds influence in the center facing towards the lower side. In the game, Yamashita's strategy succeeds beyond his wildest dreams.

White's responses at 20 and 22 are inconsistent. *Dias. 4, 6, and 6* shed light on this contradiction.

Dia. 4. White 2 induces Black 3. After this exchange it is clear White can't make a base here with A-Black D-White B or C, as this limited space doesn't secure eyes. So even trying to do so takes away other possibilities. Therefore, after White 2-Black 3, running out into the center with White 4 is a consistent strategy. Once these stones are safe, White can aim at invading at D.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. However, if White wants to settle his stones, he should exchange White 2 for 3 first, then extend to 4, even if this means the marked white stone is in a slightly odd place. Still, this stone helps protect against a possible attack at A. All in all, this is not such a bad result for White.

Dia. 6. (Next page) We shouldn't dismiss the possibility of Black ignoring White 2 and not answering at A. His aim would be to cut off the marked stone with an attachment at 3. However, White 4 through 8 quickly deal with Black's attack. Black B is answered with White C, so Black's two stones are caught. After extensive analysis, alternatives for Black 3 didn't have much bite either, so it seems likely that Black has little choice but to follow *Dia. 5*.

After the exchange 20 for 21, White 22 provides Black with the perfect move at 23. *Dia. 7* shows White's natural response and its pitfalls. However, the threat Black 3 poses doesn't stop there.




Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Black 1 is a good move. Since White has added a move to his marked stone, he can no longer give it up. Therefore, he has to protect against the cut at A. White 2–Black 3–White 4 come to mind, but Black 5 slips in the dagger, fouling up White's shape as the marked black stone is right on the vital point. White has no move after this.

White 24 and 26 are about the best White can do. However, Black's response at 27 makes full use of his stone at 23, forcing White to answer with 28. The reason is shown in *Dia. 8*.

Dia. 8. After 1, if White plays the natural move of 2, Black cuts with 3, forcing White to connect with 4. However thanks to the presence of the marked stone, Black can link up with 5. This is a disaster for White.



Dia. 8


Dia. 9

White could have prevented Black 27 by following *Dia. 9*.

Dia. 9. Some pros felt White had no choice but to exchange 1 for 2 before making life with 3. However, if Black just answers with 4 to cut off the marked stones, White gets a pretty bad result. Still some players were of the opinion this would have been better than the game.

There is still another possibility to consider, namely, *Dia. 10*.

Dia. 10. After Black 1, White could play 2 and 4 to make life in the corner. Black will most likely play at 5 to prevent White from linking up his marked stones. Don't get the wrong idea. This is not very good for White, but at least he is alive and he can now think about sacrificing the marked stones on a small scale or about pulling them out, depending on what happens later. In the game White's group is still not completely alive when Black descends to 33.



Dia. 10

Dia. 11

Black 29 is a clever forcing move, leaving White with no choice but to connect at 30. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 11* first, after White 2, Black 3 is answered by 4, which makes two eyes. In the game, where Black plays at 3 first, White can't play at 4 because Black can then force the exchange of A for White B before connecting at 1.

Black 33 is the correct move for restricting the white group to one eye.

After exchanging 38 for Black 39, White 40 makes his group 99% alive. Black can play A–White B–Black C–White D–Black E to reduce the corner to one eye. To make a second eye White needs to play F–Black G–White H. The only way

for Black to prevent the second eye is to play at I. Granted this is a long shot, but if more black stones appear in this neighborhood, it is not impossible.

When Black plays 43, it becomes clear that he is not only trying to cut off the two white stones, he is also looking to start a fight in the center. During that confrontation, White may just 'accidentally' die.

Even though the right side is almost empty, Black has already firmly taken the lead. The cause can be found in White's combination of 20 and 22. It must have been all the more painful for O as he was fully aware of his mistake.





Figure 3 (44-59)

Figure 3 (44-69). Yamashita's brilliant tesuji


White 44 and 46 offer the strongest resistance to Black 43. Ironically, these moves lead to the shortest road to doom.



Dia. 12

The players who were analyzing the game were unanimous in their opinion that White should attach at 1 in *Dia. 12* and play the forcing moves

through 7 before cutting with 9. Black can hardly avoid playing the hane at 10, which gives White the chance to invade the corner with 11. For sure, the game does not feel good for White, but, if he plays this way, he will not be far behind.




Dia. 13

However, *Dia. 12* is wishful thinking. When the players were shown this sequence, they both said they had read out *Dia. 13*. In response to White 1, a black hane at 2 is more interesting. White 3 is a good answer, but, after the exchange through 7, Black has sente to seal White in with A. Black's center influence is overwhelming and this should be enough to give him an easy game.

As stated before, Black had a definite lead, but turning a lead is notoriously difficult. However, Yamashita went about finishing the job in great fashion.


Black first uses his 'ace in the hole' by peeping at 47 to force White to live. However, before doing so with 54 White made some forcing moves of his own with 48 through 52.



Dia. 14

Next, Black 55 initiates a complicated fight. The moves through 66 are unavoidable. In *Dia. 14*, Black 1 (65 in the actual game) makes miai of capturing two stones with A and three stones with the sequence Black B–White C–Black D–White E–Black F. Ironically the forcing moves White played (the exchange of the marked white for black stones) before living in the corner turn out to be a burden rather than aiding him in the fight.

The only move that avoids these two traps is White 60. However, after Black 63, White has a new problem. White 64 only puts off a quick execution. Still, the solution for Black is not at all obvious.



Dia. 15

10: at the marked stone

The natural sequence after White 68 is shown in *Dia. 15*. To prevent a cut by White, Black needs to push twice at 1 and 3, before playing the knight's move at 5. If we assume White jumps out at 6, Black can then squeeze with 7 and 9 before making life with 11. Although Black is clearly leading, White can stir up trouble with A–Black B–White C, if Black wants to try and kill the white stones; however, answering White A with Black C is more realistic. If Black does indeed play at B, White C makes miai of cutting at D and connecting at E, which also cuts off the large black group below it. White may also omit the exchange A for B and jump in at C right away. It becomes clear, that Yes, Black is leading, but, No, he won't be able to kill White and decide the game quickly.

However, after exchanging Black 67 for White 68, Black comes up with a splendid tesuji which clinches the win. Black 69 is the so-called nose attachment tesuji, which is the highlight of this game. However, as this was the sealed move on the

first day, O didn't see it until the next morning. Quite a wake-up call!

In the actual game, Black plays the nose attachment tesuji of 69, which forms the highlight of this game. However, as this was the sealed move on the first day, O didn't see this move until the next morning. Quite a wake-up call!





Figure 4 (70–91)

Figure 4 (70–91). O is outread.

Even if it means the marked stones get captured, White 70 is the only move for White. If he plays any other move, such as 1 in *Dia. 16*, Black will block at 2. White can't spend his next move on escaping, as a black move at A will capture the marked stones.




Dia. 16

In other words, White is at a loss after Black 71, but he has no choice about playing at 70.


What if White follows *Dia. 17* to draw out his marked stones to somehow start a capturing race with the marked black stones? The moves through

7 form a one-way street. Starting the capturing race immediately with 8 and 10 does not work as Black fills in a liberty with 11 to reduce White's liberties to three while the marked black stones have four. Note that moves like 12 and 14 don't work either, as Black 13 and 15 make miai of escaping at A and cutting at B.



Dia. 17

Instead of 8 and 10 in *Dia. 17*, *Dia. 18* offers better prospects. When Black blocks at 1, White can push with 2 and 4, exchange 6 for 7, force 8 through 11, then cut with 12. White 18 makes miai of capturing seven black stones at A, and setting up a ladder with B. However, at this point the ladder doesn't work due to the presence of the marked black stone.



Dia. 18

After the explanation in *Dia. 18*, it becomes clear that White 72 is an attempt to set up a ladder, and that Black 73 is forced. However, instead of 73, probably nine out of ten pros would have chosen a clear capture of the four marked white stones

by playing at A to erase any bad aji these stones might have. However, Yamashita had his reasons for playing 73 — he was still a little worried about a possible attack on his stones in the lower left.

Although White got caught in the center, he gained a lot on the lower edge and if he can hold on to all of his territory in this area, the game is still close.

Black 75 threatens the white stones, but White ignores the threat to play 76 and develop the right side.

Black now spends an extra move at 77 to erase the aji in this area completely, giving White an extra move at 78.

Black 79 is a good move. Of course, its primary function is to establish a base on the right side, but it threatens to undermine White's base too. If the white group of 76 and 78 fails to make eyes locally, i.e. on the right side, Black may set up a splitting attack and White's stones at the top may die naturally.

However, White first attacks Black's base with 80, then establishes his own through 88.

Since White can't afford to defend his stones at the top, he reinforces his territory at the bottom with 90. This is a kind of fighting spirit, saying 'try to kill me if you can!' Black 91 sets out to kill the white stones on as large a scale as possible — this is another professional strategy. An amateur may try to start a hand-to-hand fight to try to kill his opponent's stones. However, a pro will try to kill such stones in a large net, without getting involved in an immediate fight. This challenges the opponent to start a fight. The defender then plays attachments and so on to make a sabaki, but this usually strengthens the attacker and causes damage to neighboring groups.





Figure 5 (92-100)

Figure 5 (92–100). Going for broke

White 92 is necessary to live with the sequence to 11 in *Dia. 19*. Without the exchange 1 for 2, Black will play at 11 and kill the white group. If White followed this diagram, he would still have a chance even if he is behind at this moment.



Dia. 19

However, 94 immediately leads to White's ruin and ultimately to the fall of the title holder. So, in that sense, White 94 may be called the losing move. O's mistake was understandable when considering his mental state after having made a series of bad moves and the struggles that followed to somehow recover. O was mentally down and out and, because of that state of mind, he made a decision to go for broke.





Figure 5 (101–119)

Figure 5 (101–119). Looking for a place to resign


Even though the cut of White 98 and the atari of 2 in this figure are very clever, the sequence through 7 spells doom for White. To limit the damage, he has to add a move at 8.

With the invasion of 13 Black sets off the time bomb that has been ticking in this area. White 14 is an all-out attempt to kill the black invader, but Black lives easily in the sequence through 19. Upon seeing this move O resigned.



Dia. 20

Dia. 20. Locally White can kill Black in the sequence to 10, but the bad aji on the outside works in Black's favor. After 11, White can't stop Black from escaping.



Dia. 21

Dia. 21. If White tries to stop Black's group from connecting to the outside, e.g., with a move like 18, Black plays the sequence from 19 to 27 causing White's position on the right to collapse.

Game Five

White: Yamashita Keigo 7-dan

Black: O Rissei Kisei

Komi: 5½ points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on 5 & 6 February 2003.

The commentary consists of explanations by Rob van Zeijst based on an interview with Yamashita.

Figure 1 (1–35). The first problem

Black 3 is a kind of probe, determining his strategy in response to White's answer. Instead of 7, Black was expected to play a second approach at 15. The moves through 15 seem a little too facile.





Figure 1 (1-35)

The moves through 20 look natural enough, but after exchanging 22 for 23, White 24 is out of place. Yamashita says he considered playing at 1 in *Dia. 1*. The moves through 9 would most likely follow. After this sequence, the move at 1 becomes superfluous. That is the reason Yamashita said he rejected this variation. Even so, it would still be better than what happened in the game.



Dia. 1

Yamashita also mentioned that White 24 was inconsistent with his strategy of building up thickness on the left side, then going for territory on the right side.

In the game, Black got sente to attach on top of White's stone with 35. The question is how White should cope with this move.




Figure 2 (36-78)


Figure 2 (36-78). A problematic ko erupts.

Yamashita thought White 36 was the bigger problem than 24. He said he should have approached from A, letting Black take the upper right corner with a move at 39 or 36. Next, White should play at 56, then wait for a chance to do something in the upper right. That should have been his strategy.

White 44 is another move that doesn't show good judgment. Connecting at 45 is better — an opinion that Yamashita agreed with. Black would probably extend to 55. That would give a more normal result.

In the game, Black gets terrific shape when he captures a stone with 45 and 47. In spite of the overall opinion that White gets bad shape when Black extends to 55, Yamashita still maintained that the result was unfavorable but not terrible.

The game now comes down to how well Black can manage in the center.




Dia. 2

White 56 requires a defense at 57, while Black 59 is the only response to White 58. If Black ignores 58, White will play 1 through 5 in *Dia. 2*, taking away the base of Black's stones while making one for his own stones. Black needs to spend another move to make his corner alive, otherwise White will play A-Black B-White C-Black


D-White E-Black F-White G-Black H. Next, White throws in at A to kill the group.

A move such as Black 59 is more important than any other move because it secures the base of black stones on the left and threatens the base of the white stones on the right.

When asked about the meaning of the 70-71 exchange, Yamashita said he had no choice because if he just extended to 1 in *Dia. 3* without any preparation, Black would counter with 2 and 4, then cut with 6. White's position would fall apart.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Yamashita said the position would still be bad for him even if Black made good shape with 1 in *Dia. 4* and allowed him to extend to 2. A good follow-up is difficult to find, but after strengthening his group in this way, Black can next aim at A. However, as this way of playing constitutes a compromise, Yamashita thinks O would probably not choose this variation.

When asked whether the ko Black starts with 73 and 75 is a problem, Yamashita didn't give a direct answer. He summed it all up by saying that after the sequence to 92, White has no reason to be dissatisfied. He suggested that Black is better off playing at B. But if that is better than the game, Black should probably have followed *Dia. 4*. However, he didn't give a definitive answer.

Figure 3 (79-100). A swap levels the playing field.

In response to the ko threat at 88, Black has no choice but to resolve the ko with 89. If he continues the ko by answering the marked white stone with 1 in *Dia. 5*, he eventually runs out of ko threats when White captures the ko with 14. Even if Black makes a placement at A, White resolves the ko with B. Black C next is big, but the white stones just escape and are

in no danger of being captured, so Black's compensation for losing the ko is too small.





Figure 3 (79-100)

84: takes ko (below 81); 87: takes ko at 81



Dia. 5

5, 11: right of 2; 8, 14: at 2

Yamashita was satisfied with the swap that resulted. During the game he felt he had turned a bad game into a good fight. He believed the playing field was level again. The reason for this is that after White 92, the white group has been stabilized while the black group is destabilized and needs reinforcement. In the process of running out into the center to make eyes, White becomes strong in the center and erases Black's moyo at the top in a natural way.

Yamashita pointed out earlier that the game had come down to how well Black can manage in the center. By the end of Figure 3, Black didn't manage it so

well, so Yamashita felt good about that. Yamashita also had the impression Black didn't want White to touch the moyo at the top and, in order to minimize damage, Black chose to extend to 99 rather than play a hane at 100, which would be answered with White A, a move that would inflict more damage.




Figure 4 (101-109)

Figure 4 (101-109). Ko threats in anticipation of a ko

O defended with 1. However, Black would probably have been better off extending to 2. Black 1 certainly makes for a quick life, but it leaves behind a lot of ko threats, as we'll later see. If Black had extended to 2, fewer ko threats would be available to White, making it more difficult for him to start a ko. Can the reader see the ko Yamashita has in mind?




Figure 5 (110-150)

16, 22, 28, 48: takes ko (above 11);
19, 25, 37: takes ko at 13; 50: connects at 13

Figure 5 (110-150). A second ko erupts.

White immediately starts a ko by playing at 10. Black can't allow White to easily make life at 29 because this would erode Black's territory. Therefore, Black has no choice but to play 11. White 12 is the only move which starts the ko. This is the natural flow. During the ko fight, both Black and White make ko threats at 20 and 23 that lose points. Yamashita commented, "Yes they do lose points, but the value of the ko is so large, it can't be helped."

After White 28, Black has run out of ko threats, so he connects at 29 to protect his territory.

Asked whether he had long been aiming at 30, Yamashita said it was barely something to aim for, but he simply didn't know how to handle his group in the upper left. After White 32, Black has to run out with 33, as a white sente move there would be unbearable.

In the end, White made eye-shape with 40. Wouldn't it be better to run out into the center? Yamashita commented that even if White managed to run out into the center, he would still not be alive. On the other hand, White 40 makes certain life. This move has another meaning too. It prevents Black from capturing a stone with 42, stopping Black from making an eye there. This makes cutting with the combination of White A-Black B-White C-Black D sente for White. Before finally making definite life with 50, White cuts through with 44 and 46 in sente, then takes the ko with 48. Asked how Yamashita felt about the game at this point, he answered he felt he was slightly ahead. And the fact Black played at 49 instead of E also indicated that O Rissei probably felt the same way. A move at E has much more strength in the center, but compared to 49 it is a loss of about 1½ points. In response to White F, Black has to play at G, which makes White H sente. Obviously O wanted to take a risk in the center even though he incurred a sure loss of a point and a half.

Preventing White from executing this plan while surrounding the territory at the top is now Black's main concern. Will he be able to do both at the same time?

Figure 6 (151-165). A deep invasion

With 51 Black tries to expand his territory as much as possible and this has a direct impact on the final outcome. Yamashita took the opportunity to invade as deeply as he possible. During the game,

the pros analyzing it were shocked — they had expected White to go no farther than A. When told that, Yamashita replied that White A would be answered with C. This is far too easy on Black, as it kills off the potential of the marked white stone. Although this may seem dangerous, he wanted to save his marked stone. The value of this stone lies in the fact that White can cut at B in sente and try to cut off Black's stones to the left of his marked stone. Compare this with the commentary around move 140 in Figure 5.





Figure 6 (151-165)

Of course, Black resisted with the knight's move of 53. White's stones now seem to be in danger, but Yamashita was never afraid his stones would be captured and believed they would eventually survive because Black had weaknesses as well. Yamashita's statement changes the mood from 'White has to go as far as this in order to win' to 'White can actually go this far' — a big difference in nuance.


However, when Black tried to catch this stone, how exactly did it survive?



Dia. 6

In the first place, instead of 57 in the game, what if Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 6*? White will first force the exchange of 2 through 5 to cut in sente. He will then increase his liberties with 6 through 11 and cut through with 12 and 14. After Black 15, White 16 makes liberties for his own stones while taking liberties away from Black's in order to win the capturing race between these groups. White has to be careful when Black plays at A. Before answering at D, he should first exchange B for C. That way, should Black feel the urge to cut at E, he can capture that stone with F.

Instead of 1 in *Dia. 6*, if Black plays at G, White first exchanges 2 through 5, then responds with 14—Black 1—White 12. The rest of the diagram is similar, only Black 15 is then located at G, leaving White with even more liberties.



Dia. 7

Instead of 59, what about Black 1 in *Dia. 7*? Yamashita indicated White 2 as the tesuji he had prepared. If Black cuts at 6 right away, White will escape with 5. If Black tries to capture all of White's stones with 3, exchanging White 4 for Black 5 before connecting at 6 is the tesuji. This makes miai of capturing the marked stones and cutting through with 8 and 10 if Black saves his marked stones with 7. After White 10, the three black stones around 3 cannot escape.

When Black plays 65, the invading white group still seems to be in danger. However, Yamashita maintained he never doubted that his group could escape.

Figure 7 (166-186). A third ko

The moves 66 through 70 prepare for the attachment at 72. When Black played at 75, Yamashita said he saw how a ko would develop. Instead of the variation in the actual game, he also thought of playing at 81 to start a capturing race right away. Unfortunately, he couldn't read it out far enough, so when he saw the possibility of the ko and found that he

had more ko threats, he took no chances. However, he still thought that playing at 81 instead of 80 was a real possibility and, if it worked, it was clearly better than what happened in the game. White 76, 78, and 84 prepare for the ko. The exchange 84 for 85 takes away a crucial liberty of Black's group should Black decide to resolve the ko and start a capturing race with the center group.




Figure 7 (166-186)





Figure 8 (187-200)

90: takes ko below 87; 93: takes ko at 87

Figure 8 (187-200). The ko decides the game.


Both 88 and 91 are ko threats that need to be answered. But why does Black ignore White 94? Yamashita: 'Let's say Black answers the ko threat with 1 in *Dia. 8*. White captures the ko and Black has to find a ko threat. Black 3 threatens a cut at 5 and this is Black's best bet. However, White ig-

nores the threat and resolves the ko with 4. Black finishes his ko threat by cutting with 5. But now White 6 is severe. After White 8, Black needs to defend with 9 to win the capturing race with White's center group. But then White 10 captures the upper left corner group to take a comfortable lead.'



Dia. 8

Another thing that needs to be checked is what happens if Black follows *Dia. 9*, i.e. he plays 1 as in *Dia. 8*, then connects at 3 in response to White 2. In that case, White cuts with 4. After White 6, Black can't simply cut at 9 because White A-Black B-White C captures five black stones. On the other hand, if Black first exchanges 7 for 8, he can cut at 9, but he now loses the capturing race outright when White plays 10 through 14.



Dia. 9

8: takes ko (at the marked stone)

So the result through 96 in the actual game is inevitable. Yamashita comments that the game is close but White is leading.

Black 97 doesn't actually keep White from eroding this area, as shown by White 98 and 100.





Figure 9 (201-259)
27, 33, 39: take ko (at the marked stone)
30, 36, 42: take ko (at 2)

Figure 9 (201-259). A slip-up obscures the outcome.

Even though White is leading slightly, at some point his prospects look unclear, according to some pros analyzing the game. Confronted with this statement, Yamashita answered that there are some subtle problems, e.g. whether 2 should be at A or instead of 20 White should connect at 21, but what is obviously bad is the hane and connection of 24 and 26. This obscures the game.

Yamashita then goes on to say that he should have cut at 32 right away, because in effect, in the game, he exchanged 24 and 26 for 31. Had he cut at 32 right away, the rest of the moves to 56 would likely be the same as in the game. Then, it becomes obvious that the exchange of 24 and 26 for 31 is a loss, especially when Black was able to catch a stone with 57.



Dia. 10

However, there was a reason for Yamashita's slip-up. If Black ignores White 24 and 26, White 1 in *Dia. 10* will wreak havoc. The moves through 8 are just one variation but basically this group will become ko.

In the game, though, Black 27 and 31 are an attempt to earn some points by playing forcing moves before living. But these forcing moves were Yamashita's mistake. However, at that moment, he was already in *byo-yomi* and didn't know the exact score other than that he thought he was ahead after he had pulled out his center stones.

Naturally, the question arises whether starting the ko with 32 was correct. But anyway, looking back on the sequence to 57, Yamashita felt he had lost some points. However, during the game he had gotten a little confused.

When it was pointed out that most amateurs thought pros in the class of Yamashita would be able to read out everything with an accuracy of half a point, Yamashita answered that that idea is false and even after the game while analyzing, in this case there was no definite answer to what the correct moves and the correct order was. Also, since he was in *byo-yomi* and so many kos had already occurred on the board, Yamashita also lost track of where to take the ko.




Figure 10 (260-300)
65, 71, 77, 83, 89, 95: take ko (left of 62);
68, 74, 80, 86, 92: take ko (at 62)
97: connects (at 62)

Figure 9 (260-300). A lucky win

White is unavoidable. He has run out of ko threats and if he doesn't play here, Black will cut at A.

Yamashita was then asked whether, then, there was no move at which he had read out completely that he was going to win. He answered that indeed that was true, and on top of that, had Black played at B instead of connecting at 97, he would have lost the game by half a point. So that seems to mean Black 97 was the losing move. In other words, Black is in a stronger position to fight the ko. When he played at 98, Yamashita had secured a half-point victory. But he adds, 'I can say that now after the game is over, but during the game I had no idea. It was only because O Rissei's play had become dull so I thought at the time "Is it really OK to get away like this?"'

Figure 11 (301–364). A long game

The only reason why the final score widened to 1½ points was because O forgot to play atari at 22.

In the end the game lasted 364 moves. It was a tough battle. Yamashita adds that the only thing he can say is that luck was on his side.

Black wins by ½ point.




Figure 11 (301–364)

35: at 26; 43: at the marked stone;
41, 47, 53, 59: take ko (left of 38);
44, 50, 56, 62: take ko (at 38);
64: connects (left of 38)

Mastering the Basics, Volume Three *Making Good Shape*

by Rob van Zeijst and Richard Bozulich

Understanding and recognizing good shape is important for becoming a strong player and developing the intuition that will instantly guide you to finding the strongest moves in the opening and the middle-game fighting.

The brain is made up of two hemispheres whose functions are different but complementary. The right hemisphere is superior in handling geometrical concepts and the left hemisphere is superior in handling analytical processes. Playing go involves an interesting interplay between these two abilities. The right hemisphere provides the geometrical vision necessary to see the shape that you wish to achieve while the left hemisphere provides the analysis that is needed to achieve that shape. Studying shape is an excellent vehicle for developing and integrating both the geometrical and analytical powers of the brain.

The first chapter begins with an extensive theoretical introduction to shape, beginning with the efficient placement of stones. It then goes on to discuss thickness—how to use it and how to counter it, and how, if used improperly, it can result in the overconcentration of stones. It continues by contrasting the concept of thick stones with that of thin stones, then finally explains what are heavy stones and what are light stones, and how these relate to the important concept of sabaki, which is essentially a method for making good shape.

The second chapter gives examples of the standard shapes, both good and bad, and the third chapter consists of 245 problems to give readers the practice needed to hone their ability to find the shape move in their games. The book ends with two example games.

Suggested retail price: US\$15.00 (¥1,800 for orders sent from Japan)

This book may be ordered from Kiseido's online shop at: <http://www.kiseido.com/>

Original Japanese Woodblock Prints

Original Japanese wooden block prints (*ukiyo-e*) on go themes by great Japanese artist are available for sale by Mita Arts Gallery. All prints are accompanied with a Letter of Authenticity. Mita Arts is a specialist in Japanese prints and is now celebrating its 40th anniversary. The print below is currently being offered for sale.

Title: Raiko's Retainers Subdue Goblins While Playing Go

Artist: Kuniyoshi

Date: 1834–35; published in 1861

Publisher: Yamaguchiya Tobei

Format: Oban triptych

Price: ¥1,700,000



This is the third and last of Kuniyoshi's great triptychs on the Raiko-Tsuchigumo subject (See <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/raiko.html> and *Go World* #62 for the story). It was published just before his death at the age of 63, even though he had designed it 27 years earlier. It shows the artist in the furiously energetic, large-figure style of his youth. Sakata no Kintoki is on the right playing a black stone, Usui Sadamitsu is watching, and Watanabe no Tsuna is on the left. An amusing detail of prints on this subject is that the players are shown as being so engrossed in their game that the goblins seem no more than a trivial nuisance.

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